TU Darmstadt / ULB / TUbiblio

LIDOR: A Lightweight DoS-Resilient Communication Protocol for Safety-Critical IoT Systems

Stute, Milan ; Agarwal, Pranay ; Kumar, Abhinav ; Asadi, Arash ; Hollick, Matthias (2020)
LIDOR: A Lightweight DoS-Resilient Communication Protocol for Safety-Critical IoT Systems.
In: IEEE Internet of Things Journal, 2020, 7 (8)
doi: 10.25534/tuprints-00013320
Artikel, Zweitveröffentlichung, Postprint

Kurzbeschreibung (Abstract)

IoT devices penetrate different aspects of our life including critical services, such as health monitoring, public safety, and autonomous driving. Such safety-critical IoT systems often consist of a large number of devices and need to withstand a vast range of known Denial-of-Service (DoS) network attacks to ensure a reliable operation while offering low-latency information dissemination. As the first solution to jointly achieve these goals, we propose LIDOR, a secure and lightweight multihop communication protocol designed to withstand all known variants of packet dropping attacks. Specifically, LIDOR relies on an end-to-end feedback mechanism to detect and react on unreliable links and draws solely on efficient symmetric-key cryptographic mechanisms to protect packets in transit. We show the overhead of LIDOR analytically and provide the proof of convergence for LIDOR which makes LIDOR resilient even to strong and hard-to-detect wormhole-supported grayhole attacks. In addition, we evaluate the performance via testbed experiments. The results indicate that LIDOR improves the reliability under DoS attacks by up to 91% and reduces network overhead by 32% compared to a state-of-the-art benchmark scheme.

Typ des Eintrags: Artikel
Erschienen: 2020
Autor(en): Stute, Milan ; Agarwal, Pranay ; Kumar, Abhinav ; Asadi, Arash ; Hollick, Matthias
Art des Eintrags: Zweitveröffentlichung
Titel: LIDOR: A Lightweight DoS-Resilient Communication Protocol for Safety-Critical IoT Systems
Sprache: Englisch
Publikationsjahr: 2020
Publikationsdatum der Erstveröffentlichung: 2020
Verlag: IEEE
Titel der Zeitschrift, Zeitung oder Schriftenreihe: IEEE Internet of Things Journal
Jahrgang/Volume einer Zeitschrift: 7
(Heft-)Nummer: 8
DOI: 10.25534/tuprints-00013320
URL / URN: https://tuprints.ulb.tu-darmstadt.de/13320
Zugehörige Links:
Herkunft: Zweitveröffentlichungsservice
Kurzbeschreibung (Abstract):

IoT devices penetrate different aspects of our life including critical services, such as health monitoring, public safety, and autonomous driving. Such safety-critical IoT systems often consist of a large number of devices and need to withstand a vast range of known Denial-of-Service (DoS) network attacks to ensure a reliable operation while offering low-latency information dissemination. As the first solution to jointly achieve these goals, we propose LIDOR, a secure and lightweight multihop communication protocol designed to withstand all known variants of packet dropping attacks. Specifically, LIDOR relies on an end-to-end feedback mechanism to detect and react on unreliable links and draws solely on efficient symmetric-key cryptographic mechanisms to protect packets in transit. We show the overhead of LIDOR analytically and provide the proof of convergence for LIDOR which makes LIDOR resilient even to strong and hard-to-detect wormhole-supported grayhole attacks. In addition, we evaluate the performance via testbed experiments. The results indicate that LIDOR improves the reliability under DoS attacks by up to 91% and reduces network overhead by 32% compared to a state-of-the-art benchmark scheme.

Status: Postprint
URN: urn:nbn:de:tuda-tuprints-133208
Sachgruppe der Dewey Dezimalklassifikatin (DDC): 000 Allgemeines, Informatik, Informationswissenschaft > 004 Informatik
Fachbereich(e)/-gebiet(e): 20 Fachbereich Informatik
20 Fachbereich Informatik > Sichere Mobile Netze
Profilbereiche
Profilbereiche > Cybersicherheit (CYSEC)
LOEWE
LOEWE > LOEWE-Zentren
LOEWE > LOEWE-Zentren > emergenCITY
Hinterlegungsdatum: 30 Nov 2020 12:53
Letzte Änderung: 28 Jun 2021 09:53
PPN:
Zugehörige Links:
Export:
Suche nach Titel in: TUfind oder in Google
Frage zum Eintrag Frage zum Eintrag

Optionen (nur für Redakteure)
Redaktionelle Details anzeigen Redaktionelle Details anzeigen