Schneider, Thomas ; Treiber, Amos (2020)
A Comment on Privacy-Preserving Scalar Product Protocols as proposed in "SPOC".
In: IEEE Transactions on Parallel and Distributed Systems, 31 (3)
doi: 10.1109/TPDS.2019.2939313
Artikel, Bibliographie
Kurzbeschreibung (Abstract)
Privacy-preserving scalar product (PPSP) protocols are an important building block for secure computation tasks in various applications. Lu et al. (TPDS'13) introduced a PPSP protocol that does not rely on cryptographic assumptions and that is used in a wide range of publications to date. In this comment paper, we show that Lu et al.'s protocol is insecure and should not be used. We describe specific attacks against it and, using impossibility results of Impagliazzo and Rudich (STOC'89), show that it is inherently insecure and cannot be fixed without relying on at least some cryptographic assumptions.
Typ des Eintrags: | Artikel |
---|---|
Erschienen: | 2020 |
Autor(en): | Schneider, Thomas ; Treiber, Amos |
Art des Eintrags: | Bibliographie |
Titel: | A Comment on Privacy-Preserving Scalar Product Protocols as proposed in "SPOC" |
Sprache: | Englisch |
Publikationsjahr: | 1 März 2020 |
Verlag: | IEEE |
Titel der Zeitschrift, Zeitung oder Schriftenreihe: | IEEE Transactions on Parallel and Distributed Systems |
Jahrgang/Volume einer Zeitschrift: | 31 |
(Heft-)Nummer: | 3 |
DOI: | 10.1109/TPDS.2019.2939313 |
URL / URN: | https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/xpl/RecentIssue.jsp?punumber=71 |
Kurzbeschreibung (Abstract): | Privacy-preserving scalar product (PPSP) protocols are an important building block for secure computation tasks in various applications. Lu et al. (TPDS'13) introduced a PPSP protocol that does not rely on cryptographic assumptions and that is used in a wide range of publications to date. In this comment paper, we show that Lu et al.'s protocol is insecure and should not be used. We describe specific attacks against it and, using impossibility results of Impagliazzo and Rudich (STOC'89), show that it is inherently insecure and cannot be fixed without relying on at least some cryptographic assumptions. |
Freie Schlagworte: | Engineering, E4 |
Fachbereich(e)/-gebiet(e): | 20 Fachbereich Informatik 20 Fachbereich Informatik > Praktische Kryptographie und Privatheit DFG-Sonderforschungsbereiche (inkl. Transregio) DFG-Sonderforschungsbereiche (inkl. Transregio) > Sonderforschungsbereiche DFG-Graduiertenkollegs DFG-Graduiertenkollegs > Graduiertenkolleg 2050 Privacy and Trust for Mobile Users Profilbereiche Profilbereiche > Cybersicherheit (CYSEC) LOEWE LOEWE > LOEWE-Zentren LOEWE > LOEWE-Zentren > CRISP - Center for Research in Security and Privacy DFG-Sonderforschungsbereiche (inkl. Transregio) > Sonderforschungsbereiche > SFB 1119: CROSSING – Kryptographiebasierte Sicherheitslösungen als Grundlage für Vertrauen in heutigen und zukünftigen IT-Systemen |
Hinterlegungsdatum: | 06 Sep 2019 06:28 |
Letzte Änderung: | 20 Jun 2024 09:39 |
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