Nyman, Thomas ; Dessouky, Ghada ; Zeitouni, Shaza ; Lehikoinen, Aaro ; Paverd, Andrew ; Asokan, N. ; Sadeghi, Ahmad-Reza (2017)
HardScope: Thwarting DOP with Hardware-assisted Run-time Scope Enforcement.
In: Cryptography and Security, abs/1705.10295
Artikel, Bibliographie
Kurzbeschreibung (Abstract)
Widespread use of memory unsafe programming languages (e.g., C and C++) leaves many systems vulnerable to memory corruption attacks. A variety of defenses have been proposed to mitigate attacks that exploit memory errors to hijack the control flow of the code at run-time, e.g., (fine-grained) randomization or Control Flow Integrity. However, recent work on data-oriented programming (DOP) demonstrated highly expressive (Turing-complete) attacks, even in the presence of these state-of-the-art defenses. Although multiple real-world DOP attacks have been demonstrated, no efficient defenses are yet available. We propose run-time scope enforcement (RSE), a novel approach designed to efficiently mitigate all currently known DOP attacks by enforcing compile-time memory safety constraints (e.g., variable visibility rules) at run-time. We present HardScope, a proof-of-concept implementation of hardware-assisted RSE for the new RISC-V open instruction set architecture. We discuss our systematic empirical evaluation of HardScope which demonstrates that it can mitigate all currently known DOP attacks, and has a real-world performance overhead of 3.2% in embedded benchmarks.
| Typ des Eintrags: | Artikel |
|---|---|
| Erschienen: | 2017 |
| Autor(en): | Nyman, Thomas ; Dessouky, Ghada ; Zeitouni, Shaza ; Lehikoinen, Aaro ; Paverd, Andrew ; Asokan, N. ; Sadeghi, Ahmad-Reza |
| Art des Eintrags: | Bibliographie |
| Titel: | HardScope: Thwarting DOP with Hardware-assisted Run-time Scope Enforcement |
| Sprache: | Englisch |
| Publikationsjahr: | 2017 |
| Titel der Zeitschrift, Zeitung oder Schriftenreihe: | Cryptography and Security |
| Jahrgang/Volume einer Zeitschrift: | abs/1705.10295 |
| URL / URN: | http://arxiv.org/abs/1705.10295 |
| Kurzbeschreibung (Abstract): | Widespread use of memory unsafe programming languages (e.g., C and C++) leaves many systems vulnerable to memory corruption attacks. A variety of defenses have been proposed to mitigate attacks that exploit memory errors to hijack the control flow of the code at run-time, e.g., (fine-grained) randomization or Control Flow Integrity. However, recent work on data-oriented programming (DOP) demonstrated highly expressive (Turing-complete) attacks, even in the presence of these state-of-the-art defenses. Although multiple real-world DOP attacks have been demonstrated, no efficient defenses are yet available. We propose run-time scope enforcement (RSE), a novel approach designed to efficiently mitigate all currently known DOP attacks by enforcing compile-time memory safety constraints (e.g., variable visibility rules) at run-time. We present HardScope, a proof-of-concept implementation of hardware-assisted RSE for the new RISC-V open instruction set architecture. We discuss our systematic empirical evaluation of HardScope which demonstrates that it can mitigate all currently known DOP attacks, and has a real-world performance overhead of 3.2% in embedded benchmarks. |
| Freie Schlagworte: | Primitives; P3; Solutions; S2 |
| Fachbereich(e)/-gebiet(e): | 20 Fachbereich Informatik 20 Fachbereich Informatik > Systemsicherheit DFG-Sonderforschungsbereiche (inkl. Transregio) DFG-Sonderforschungsbereiche (inkl. Transregio) > Sonderforschungsbereiche Profilbereiche Profilbereiche > Cybersicherheit (CYSEC) DFG-Sonderforschungsbereiche (inkl. Transregio) > Sonderforschungsbereiche > SFB 1119: CROSSING – Kryptographiebasierte Sicherheitslösungen als Grundlage für Vertrauen in heutigen und zukünftigen IT-Systemen |
| Hinterlegungsdatum: | 15 Jan 2019 10:58 |
| Letzte Änderung: | 13 Mai 2019 11:54 |
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