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Simulatable Channels: Extended Security that is Universally Composable and Easier to Prove

Degabriele, Jean Paul ; Fischlin, Marc (2018)
Simulatable Channels: Extended Security that is Universally Composable and Easier to Prove.
24th International Conference on the Theory and Application of Cryptology and Information Security. Brisbane, Australia (02.12.2018-06.12.2018)
doi: 10.1007/978-3-030-03332-3_19
Konferenzveröffentlichung, Bibliographie

Kurzbeschreibung (Abstract)

Ever since the foundational work of Goldwasser and Micali, simulation has proven to be a powerful and versatile construct for formulating security in various areas of cryptography. However security definitions based on simulation are generally harder to work with than game based definitions, often resulting in more complicated proofs. In this work we challenge this viewpoint by proposing new simulation-based security definitions for secure channels that in many cases lead to simpler proofs of security. We are particularly interested in definitions of secure channels which reflect real-world requirements, such as, protecting against the replay and reordering of ciphertexts, accounting for leakage from the decryption of invalid ciphertexts, and retaining security in the presence of ciphertext fragmentation. Furthermore we show that our proposed notion of channel simulatability implies a secure channel functionality that is universally composable. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to study universally composable secure channels supporting these extended security goals. We conclude, by showing that the Dropbear implementation of SSH-CTR is channel simulatable in the presence of ciphertext fragmentation, and therefore also realises a universally composable secure channel. This is intended, in part, to highlight the merits of our approach over prior ones in admitting simpler security proofs in comparable settings.

Typ des Eintrags: Konferenzveröffentlichung
Erschienen: 2018
Autor(en): Degabriele, Jean Paul ; Fischlin, Marc
Art des Eintrags: Bibliographie
Titel: Simulatable Channels: Extended Security that is Universally Composable and Easier to Prove
Sprache: Englisch
Publikationsjahr: 26 Oktober 2018
Verlag: Springer
Buchtitel: Advances in Cryptology - ASIACRYPT 2018
Reihe: Lecture Notes in Computer Science
Band einer Reihe: 11274
Veranstaltungstitel: 24th International Conference on the Theory and Application of Cryptology and Information Security
Veranstaltungsort: Brisbane, Australia
Veranstaltungsdatum: 02.12.2018-06.12.2018
DOI: 10.1007/978-3-030-03332-3_19
URL / URN: https://asiacrypt.iacr.org/2018/index.html
Kurzbeschreibung (Abstract):

Ever since the foundational work of Goldwasser and Micali, simulation has proven to be a powerful and versatile construct for formulating security in various areas of cryptography. However security definitions based on simulation are generally harder to work with than game based definitions, often resulting in more complicated proofs. In this work we challenge this viewpoint by proposing new simulation-based security definitions for secure channels that in many cases lead to simpler proofs of security. We are particularly interested in definitions of secure channels which reflect real-world requirements, such as, protecting against the replay and reordering of ciphertexts, accounting for leakage from the decryption of invalid ciphertexts, and retaining security in the presence of ciphertext fragmentation. Furthermore we show that our proposed notion of channel simulatability implies a secure channel functionality that is universally composable. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to study universally composable secure channels supporting these extended security goals. We conclude, by showing that the Dropbear implementation of SSH-CTR is channel simulatable in the presence of ciphertext fragmentation, and therefore also realises a universally composable secure channel. This is intended, in part, to highlight the merits of our approach over prior ones in admitting simpler security proofs in comparable settings.

Freie Schlagworte: Solutions, S4
Zusätzliche Informationen:

Vol. III

Fachbereich(e)/-gebiet(e): 20 Fachbereich Informatik
20 Fachbereich Informatik > Kryptographie und Komplexitätstheorie
DFG-Sonderforschungsbereiche (inkl. Transregio)
DFG-Sonderforschungsbereiche (inkl. Transregio) > Sonderforschungsbereiche
Profilbereiche
Profilbereiche > Cybersicherheit (CYSEC)
DFG-Sonderforschungsbereiche (inkl. Transregio) > Sonderforschungsbereiche > SFB 1119: CROSSING – Kryptographiebasierte Sicherheitslösungen als Grundlage für Vertrauen in heutigen und zukünftigen IT-Systemen
Hinterlegungsdatum: 18 Okt 2018 09:18
Letzte Änderung: 27 Jul 2023 13:14
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