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Invisible Sanitizable Signatures and Public-Key Encryption are Equivalent

Fischlin, Marc ; Harasser, Patrick (2018)
Invisible Sanitizable Signatures and Public-Key Encryption are Equivalent.
16th International Conference on Applied Cryptography and Network Security. Leuven, Belgium (02.-04.07.2018)
doi: 10.1007/978-3-319-93387-0_11
Konferenzveröffentlichung, Bibliographie

Kurzbeschreibung (Abstract)

Sanitizable signature schemes are signature schemes which support the delegation of modification rights. The signer can allow a sanitizer to perform a set of admissible operations on the original message and then to update the signature, in such a way that basic security properties like unforgeability or accountability are preserved. Recently, Camenisch et al. (PKC 2017) devised new schemes with the previously unattained invisibility property. This property says that the set of admissible operations for the sanitizer remains hidden from outsiders. Subsequently, Beck et al. (ACISP 2017) gave an even stronger version of this notion and constructions achieving it. Here we characterize the invisibility property in both forms by showing that invisible sanitizable signatures are equivalent to IND−CPA-secure encryption schemes, and strongly invisible signatures are equivalent to IND−CCA2-secure encryption schemes. The equivalence is established by proving that invisible (resp. strongly invisible) sanitizable signature schemes yield IND−CPA-secure (resp. IND−CCA2-secure) public-key encryption schemes and that, vice versa, we can build (strongly) invisible sanitizable signatures given a corresponding public-key encryption scheme.

Typ des Eintrags: Konferenzveröffentlichung
Erschienen: 2018
Autor(en): Fischlin, Marc ; Harasser, Patrick
Art des Eintrags: Bibliographie
Titel: Invisible Sanitizable Signatures and Public-Key Encryption are Equivalent
Sprache: Englisch
Publikationsjahr: 10 Juni 2018
Verlag: Springer
Buchtitel: Applied Cryptography and Network Security - ACNS 2018
Reihe: Lecture Notes in Computer Science
Band einer Reihe: 10892
Veranstaltungstitel: 16th International Conference on Applied Cryptography and Network Security
Veranstaltungsort: Leuven, Belgium
Veranstaltungsdatum: 02.-04.07.2018
DOI: 10.1007/978-3-319-93387-0_11
URL / URN: https://www.springer.com/us/book/9783319933863
Kurzbeschreibung (Abstract):

Sanitizable signature schemes are signature schemes which support the delegation of modification rights. The signer can allow a sanitizer to perform a set of admissible operations on the original message and then to update the signature, in such a way that basic security properties like unforgeability or accountability are preserved. Recently, Camenisch et al. (PKC 2017) devised new schemes with the previously unattained invisibility property. This property says that the set of admissible operations for the sanitizer remains hidden from outsiders. Subsequently, Beck et al. (ACISP 2017) gave an even stronger version of this notion and constructions achieving it. Here we characterize the invisibility property in both forms by showing that invisible sanitizable signatures are equivalent to IND−CPA-secure encryption schemes, and strongly invisible signatures are equivalent to IND−CCA2-secure encryption schemes. The equivalence is established by proving that invisible (resp. strongly invisible) sanitizable signature schemes yield IND−CPA-secure (resp. IND−CCA2-secure) public-key encryption schemes and that, vice versa, we can build (strongly) invisible sanitizable signatures given a corresponding public-key encryption scheme.

Freie Schlagworte: Primitives, P2
Fachbereich(e)/-gebiet(e): 20 Fachbereich Informatik
20 Fachbereich Informatik > Kryptographie und Komplexitätstheorie
DFG-Sonderforschungsbereiche (inkl. Transregio)
DFG-Sonderforschungsbereiche (inkl. Transregio) > Sonderforschungsbereiche
Profilbereiche
Profilbereiche > Cybersicherheit (CYSEC)
DFG-Sonderforschungsbereiche (inkl. Transregio) > Sonderforschungsbereiche > SFB 1119: CROSSING – Kryptographiebasierte Sicherheitslösungen als Grundlage für Vertrauen in heutigen und zukünftigen IT-Systemen
Hinterlegungsdatum: 23 Jul 2018 07:46
Letzte Änderung: 02 Aug 2023 14:35
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