Ibrahim, Ahmad ; Sadeghi, Ahmad-Reza ; Zeitouni, Shaza (2017)
SeED: Secure Non-Interactive Attestation for Embedded Devices.
Boston, USA
Konferenzveröffentlichung, Bibliographie
Kurzbeschreibung (Abstract)
Remote attestation is a security service that is typically realized by an interactive challenge-response protocol that allows a trusted verifier to capture the state of a potentially untrusted remote device. However, existing attestation schemes are vulnerable to Denial of Service (DoS) attacks, which can be carried out by swamping the targeted device with fake attestation requests. In this paper, we propose SeED, the first non-interactive attestation protocol that mitigates DoS attacks and is highly efficient. Designing such a protocol is not straightforward, since it relies on a potentially malicious prover to trigger the attestation process. We investigate the related challenges and subtleties and describe how to address them with minimal assumptions. As evaluation results show, our non-interactive attestation protocol is particularly suitable for resource-constrained embedded devices, since it is highly efficient in terms of power consumption and communication.
| Typ des Eintrags: | Konferenzveröffentlichung |
|---|---|
| Erschienen: | 2017 |
| Autor(en): | Ibrahim, Ahmad ; Sadeghi, Ahmad-Reza ; Zeitouni, Shaza |
| Art des Eintrags: | Bibliographie |
| Titel: | SeED: Secure Non-Interactive Attestation for Embedded Devices |
| Sprache: | Englisch |
| Publikationsjahr: | Juli 2017 |
| Buchtitel: | 10th ACM Conference on Security and Privacy in Wireless and Mobile Networks (WiSec 2017) |
| Veranstaltungsort: | Boston, USA |
| Kurzbeschreibung (Abstract): | Remote attestation is a security service that is typically realized by an interactive challenge-response protocol that allows a trusted verifier to capture the state of a potentially untrusted remote device. However, existing attestation schemes are vulnerable to Denial of Service (DoS) attacks, which can be carried out by swamping the targeted device with fake attestation requests. In this paper, we propose SeED, the first non-interactive attestation protocol that mitigates DoS attacks and is highly efficient. Designing such a protocol is not straightforward, since it relies on a potentially malicious prover to trigger the attestation process. We investigate the related challenges and subtleties and describe how to address them with minimal assumptions. As evaluation results show, our non-interactive attestation protocol is particularly suitable for resource-constrained embedded devices, since it is highly efficient in terms of power consumption and communication. |
| Freie Schlagworte: | Solutions; S2 |
| ID-Nummer: | TUD-CS-2017-0101 |
| Fachbereich(e)/-gebiet(e): | 20 Fachbereich Informatik 20 Fachbereich Informatik > Systemsicherheit DFG-Sonderforschungsbereiche (inkl. Transregio) DFG-Sonderforschungsbereiche (inkl. Transregio) > Sonderforschungsbereiche Profilbereiche Profilbereiche > Cybersicherheit (CYSEC) DFG-Sonderforschungsbereiche (inkl. Transregio) > Sonderforschungsbereiche > SFB 1119: CROSSING – Kryptographiebasierte Sicherheitslösungen als Grundlage für Vertrauen in heutigen und zukünftigen IT-Systemen |
| Hinterlegungsdatum: | 02 Mai 2017 16:28 |
| Letzte Änderung: | 02 Mai 2019 11:19 |
| PPN: | |
| Export: | |
| Suche nach Titel in: | TUfind oder in Google |
 |
Frage zum Eintrag |
Optionen (nur für Redakteure)
 |
Redaktionelle Details anzeigen |
Drucken
Impressum