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Intercept-Resend Emulation Attacks against a Continuous-Variable Quantum Authentication Protocol with Physical Unclonable Keys

Fladung, Lukas ; Nikolopoulos, Georgios M. ; Alber, Gernot ; Fischlin, Marc (2019)
Intercept-Resend Emulation Attacks against a Continuous-Variable Quantum Authentication Protocol with Physical Unclonable Keys.
In: Cryptography, 3 (4)
doi: 10.3390/cryptography3040025
Article, Bibliographie

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Abstract

Optical physical unclonable keys are currently considered to be rather promising candidates for the development of entity authentication protocols, which offer security against both classical and quantum adversaries. In this work, we investigate the robustness of a continuous-variable protocol, which relies on the scattering of coherent states of light from the key, against three different types of intercept–resend emulation attacks. The performance of the protocol is analyzed for a broad range of physical parameters, and our results are compared to existing security bounds.

Item Type: Article
Erschienen: 2019
Creators: Fladung, Lukas ; Nikolopoulos, Georgios M. ; Alber, Gernot ; Fischlin, Marc
Type of entry: Bibliographie
Title: Intercept-Resend Emulation Attacks against a Continuous-Variable Quantum Authentication Protocol with Physical Unclonable Keys
Language: English
Date: 25 October 2019
Publisher: MDPI
Journal or Publication Title: Cryptography
Volume of the journal: 3
Issue Number: 4
Collation: 17 Seiten
DOI: 10.3390/cryptography3040025
Corresponding Links:
Abstract:

Optical physical unclonable keys are currently considered to be rather promising candidates for the development of entity authentication protocols, which offer security against both classical and quantum adversaries. In this work, we investigate the robustness of a continuous-variable protocol, which relies on the scattering of coherent states of light from the key, against three different types of intercept–resend emulation attacks. The performance of the protocol is analyzed for a broad range of physical parameters, and our results are compared to existing security bounds.

Uncontrolled Keywords: Primitives, P4, Solutions, S4
Alternative keywords:
Alternative keywordsLanguage
UNSPECIFIEDEnglish
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Art.No.: 25; Erstveröffentlichung

Divisions: 20 Department of Computer Science
20 Department of Computer Science > Cryptography and Complexity Theory
DFG-Collaborative Research Centres (incl. Transregio)
DFG-Collaborative Research Centres (incl. Transregio) > Collaborative Research Centres
Profile Areas
Profile Areas > Cybersecurity (CYSEC)
Forschungsfelder
Forschungsfelder > Information and Intelligence
Forschungsfelder > Information and Intelligence > Cybersecurity & Privacy
05 Department of Physics
05 Department of Physics > Institute of Applied Physics
05 Department of Physics > Institute of Applied Physics > Theoretical Quantum Physics Group
DFG-Collaborative Research Centres (incl. Transregio) > Collaborative Research Centres > CRC 1119: CROSSING – Cryptography-Based Security Solutions: Enabling Trust in New and Next Generation Computing Environments
Date Deposited: 10 Jun 2021 07:42
Last Modified: 20 Mar 2024 12:49
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