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Mind the GAP: Security & Privacy Risks of Contact Tracing Apps

Baumgärtner, Lars ; Dmitrienko, Alexandra ; Freisleben, Bernd ; Gruler, Alexander ; Höchst, Jonas ; Kühlberg, Joshua ; Mezini, Mira ; Mitev, Richard ; Miettinen, Markus ; Muhamedagic, Anel ; Nguyen, Thien Duc ; Penning, Alvar ; Pustelnik, Frederik ; Roos, Filipp ; Sadeghi, Ahmad-Reza ; Schwarz, Michael ; Uhl, Christian (2020)
Mind the GAP: Security & Privacy Risks of Contact Tracing Apps.
TrustCom 2020. virtual Conference (29.12.2020-01.01.2021)
Konferenzveröffentlichung, Bibliographie

Kurzbeschreibung (Abstract)

Google and Apple have jointly provided an API for exposure notification in order to implement decentralized contract tracing apps using Bluetooth Low Energy, the so-called "Google/Apple Proposal", which we abbreviate by "GAP". We demonstrate that in real-world scenarios the current GAP design is vulnerable to (i) profiling and possibly de-anonymizing infected persons, and (ii) relay-based wormhole attacks that basically can generate fake contacts with the potential of affecting the accuracy of an app-based contact tracing system. For both types of attack, we have built tools that can easily be used on mobile phones or Raspberry Pis (e.g., Bluetooth sniffers). The goal of our work is to perform a reality check towards possibly providing empirical real-world evidence for these two privacy and security risks. We hope that our findings provide valuable input for developing secure and privacy-preserving digital contact tracing systems.

Typ des Eintrags: Konferenzveröffentlichung
Erschienen: 2020
Autor(en): Baumgärtner, Lars ; Dmitrienko, Alexandra ; Freisleben, Bernd ; Gruler, Alexander ; Höchst, Jonas ; Kühlberg, Joshua ; Mezini, Mira ; Mitev, Richard ; Miettinen, Markus ; Muhamedagic, Anel ; Nguyen, Thien Duc ; Penning, Alvar ; Pustelnik, Frederik ; Roos, Filipp ; Sadeghi, Ahmad-Reza ; Schwarz, Michael ; Uhl, Christian
Art des Eintrags: Bibliographie
Titel: Mind the GAP: Security & Privacy Risks of Contact Tracing Apps
Sprache: Englisch
Publikationsjahr: Dezember 2020
Verlag: IEEE
Buchtitel: Proceedings : 2020 IEEE 19th IEEE International Conference on Trust, Security and Privacy in Computing and Communications
Veranstaltungstitel: TrustCom 2020
Veranstaltungsort: virtual Conference
Veranstaltungsdatum: 29.12.2020-01.01.2021
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Kurzbeschreibung (Abstract):

Google and Apple have jointly provided an API for exposure notification in order to implement decentralized contract tracing apps using Bluetooth Low Energy, the so-called "Google/Apple Proposal", which we abbreviate by "GAP". We demonstrate that in real-world scenarios the current GAP design is vulnerable to (i) profiling and possibly de-anonymizing infected persons, and (ii) relay-based wormhole attacks that basically can generate fake contacts with the potential of affecting the accuracy of an app-based contact tracing system. For both types of attack, we have built tools that can easily be used on mobile phones or Raspberry Pis (e.g., Bluetooth sniffers). The goal of our work is to perform a reality check towards possibly providing empirical real-world evidence for these two privacy and security risks. We hope that our findings provide valuable input for developing secure and privacy-preserving digital contact tracing systems.

Freie Schlagworte: contact tracing
Schlagworte:
Einzelne SchlagworteSprache
nicht bekanntEnglisch
Fachbereich(e)/-gebiet(e): 20 Fachbereich Informatik
20 Fachbereich Informatik > Systemsicherheit
DFG-Sonderforschungsbereiche (inkl. Transregio)
DFG-Sonderforschungsbereiche (inkl. Transregio) > Sonderforschungsbereiche
Profilbereiche
Profilbereiche > Cybersicherheit (CYSEC)
DFG-Sonderforschungsbereiche (inkl. Transregio) > Sonderforschungsbereiche > SFB 1119: CROSSING – Kryptographiebasierte Sicherheitslösungen als Grundlage für Vertrauen in heutigen und zukünftigen IT-Systemen
Hinterlegungsdatum: 03 Feb 2021 15:16
Letzte Änderung: 03 Feb 2021 15:16
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