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A Comment on Privacy-Preserving Scalar Product Protocols as proposed in "SPOC"

Schneider, Thomas ; Treiber, Amos (2020)
A Comment on Privacy-Preserving Scalar Product Protocols as proposed in "SPOC".
In: IEEE Transactions on Parallel and Distributed Systems, 31 (3)
doi: 10.1109/TPDS.2019.2939313
Artikel, Bibliographie

Kurzbeschreibung (Abstract)

Privacy-preserving scalar product (PPSP) protocols are an important building block for secure computation tasks in various applications. Lu et al. (TPDS'13) introduced a PPSP protocol that does not rely on cryptographic assumptions and that is used in a wide range of publications to date. In this comment paper, we show that Lu et al.'s protocol is insecure and should not be used. We describe specific attacks against it and, using impossibility results of Impagliazzo and Rudich (STOC'89), show that it is inherently insecure and cannot be fixed without relying on at least some cryptographic assumptions.

Typ des Eintrags: Artikel
Erschienen: 2020
Autor(en): Schneider, Thomas ; Treiber, Amos
Art des Eintrags: Bibliographie
Titel: A Comment on Privacy-Preserving Scalar Product Protocols as proposed in "SPOC"
Sprache: Englisch
Publikationsjahr: 1 März 2020
Verlag: IEEE
Titel der Zeitschrift, Zeitung oder Schriftenreihe: IEEE Transactions on Parallel and Distributed Systems
Jahrgang/Volume einer Zeitschrift: 31
(Heft-)Nummer: 3
DOI: 10.1109/TPDS.2019.2939313
URL / URN: https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/xpl/RecentIssue.jsp?punumber=71
Kurzbeschreibung (Abstract):

Privacy-preserving scalar product (PPSP) protocols are an important building block for secure computation tasks in various applications. Lu et al. (TPDS'13) introduced a PPSP protocol that does not rely on cryptographic assumptions and that is used in a wide range of publications to date. In this comment paper, we show that Lu et al.'s protocol is insecure and should not be used. We describe specific attacks against it and, using impossibility results of Impagliazzo and Rudich (STOC'89), show that it is inherently insecure and cannot be fixed without relying on at least some cryptographic assumptions.

Freie Schlagworte: Engineering, E4
Fachbereich(e)/-gebiet(e): 20 Fachbereich Informatik
20 Fachbereich Informatik > Praktische Kryptographie und Privatheit
DFG-Sonderforschungsbereiche (inkl. Transregio)
DFG-Sonderforschungsbereiche (inkl. Transregio) > Sonderforschungsbereiche
DFG-Graduiertenkollegs
DFG-Graduiertenkollegs > Graduiertenkolleg 2050 Privacy and Trust for Mobile Users
Profilbereiche
Profilbereiche > Cybersicherheit (CYSEC)
LOEWE
LOEWE > LOEWE-Zentren
LOEWE > LOEWE-Zentren > CRISP - Center for Research in Security and Privacy
DFG-Sonderforschungsbereiche (inkl. Transregio) > Sonderforschungsbereiche > SFB 1119: CROSSING – Kryptographiebasierte Sicherheitslösungen als Grundlage für Vertrauen in heutigen und zukünftigen IT-Systemen
Hinterlegungsdatum: 06 Sep 2019 06:28
Letzte Änderung: 20 Jun 2024 09:39
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