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PRF-ODH: Relations, Instantiations, and Impossibility Results

Brendel, Jacqueline ; Fischlin, Marc ; Günther, Felix ; Janson, Christian
eds.: Katz, Jonathan ; Shacham, Hovav (2017)
PRF-ODH: Relations, Instantiations, and Impossibility Results.
Santa Barbara, CA, USA
Conference or Workshop Item, Bibliographie

Abstract

The pseudorandom-function oracle-Diffie--Hellman (PRF-ODH) assumption has been introduced recently to analyze a variety of DH-based key exchange protocols, including TLS 1.2 and the TLS 1.3 candidates, as well as the extended access control (EAC) protocol. Remarkably, the assumption comes in different flavors in these settings and none of them has been scrutinized comprehensively yet. In this paper here we therefore present a systematic study of the different PRF-ODH variants in the literature. In particular, we analyze their strengths relative to each other, carving out that the variants form a hierarchy. We further investigate the boundaries between instantiating the assumptions in the standard model and the random oracle model. While we show that even the strongest variant is achievable in the random oracle model under the strong Diffie--Hellman assumption, we provide a negative result showing that it is implausible to instantiate even the weaker variants in the standard model via algebraic black-box reductions to common cryptographic problems.

Item Type: Conference or Workshop Item
Erschienen: 2017
Editors: Katz, Jonathan ; Shacham, Hovav
Creators: Brendel, Jacqueline ; Fischlin, Marc ; Günther, Felix ; Janson, Christian
Type of entry: Bibliographie
Title: PRF-ODH: Relations, Instantiations, and Impossibility Results
Language: German
Date: August 2017
Publisher: Springer
Book Title: CRYPTO 2017 - 37th International Cryptology Conference
Event Location: Santa Barbara, CA, USA
Abstract:

The pseudorandom-function oracle-Diffie--Hellman (PRF-ODH) assumption has been introduced recently to analyze a variety of DH-based key exchange protocols, including TLS 1.2 and the TLS 1.3 candidates, as well as the extended access control (EAC) protocol. Remarkably, the assumption comes in different flavors in these settings and none of them has been scrutinized comprehensively yet. In this paper here we therefore present a systematic study of the different PRF-ODH variants in the literature. In particular, we analyze their strengths relative to each other, carving out that the variants form a hierarchy. We further investigate the boundaries between instantiating the assumptions in the standard model and the random oracle model. While we show that even the strongest variant is achievable in the random oracle model under the strong Diffie--Hellman assumption, we provide a negative result showing that it is implausible to instantiate even the weaker variants in the standard model via algebraic black-box reductions to common cryptographic problems.

Uncontrolled Keywords: Solutions;S4
Identification Number: TUD-CS-2017-0107
Divisions: 20 Department of Computer Science
20 Department of Computer Science > Cryptography and Complexity Theory
DFG-Collaborative Research Centres (incl. Transregio)
DFG-Collaborative Research Centres (incl. Transregio) > Collaborative Research Centres
Profile Areas
Profile Areas > Cybersecurity (CYSEC)
DFG-Collaborative Research Centres (incl. Transregio) > Collaborative Research Centres > CRC 1119: CROSSING – Cryptography-Based Security Solutions: Enabling Trust in New and Next Generation Computing Environments
Date Deposited: 11 May 2017 14:11
Last Modified: 07 May 2019 13:54
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