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An Empirical Bandwidth Analysis of Interrupt-Related Covert Channels

Gay, Richard ; Mantel, Heiko ; Sudbrock, Henning (2013)
An Empirical Bandwidth Analysis of Interrupt-Related Covert Channels.
Konferenzveröffentlichung, Bibliographie

Kurzbeschreibung (Abstract)

We empirically evaluate interrupt-related covert channels, in short IRCCs, a type of covert channel that leverages hardware interrupts for communication. The evaluation is based on an exploit of IRCCs that we implemented as a proof-of-concept. We use a combination of experimental evaluation and information-theoretic analysis to compute the bandwidth of the channel on a concrete system. Our analysis shows a channel bandwidth of IRCCs based on interrupts of network interface cards (NICs) of approximately 5 bit/s. Besides the channel bandwidth, our experiments revealed previously unnoticed properties of IRCCs based on interrupts of NICs. While side channels based on hardware interrupts have been discussed before, this is the first experimental evaluation of covert channels based on hardware interrupts.

Typ des Eintrags: Konferenzveröffentlichung
Erschienen: 2013
Autor(en): Gay, Richard ; Mantel, Heiko ; Sudbrock, Henning
Art des Eintrags: Bibliographie
Titel: An Empirical Bandwidth Analysis of Interrupt-Related Covert Channels
Sprache: Englisch
Publikationsjahr: September 2013
Buchtitel: 2nd International Workshop on Quantitative Aspects in Security Assurance
URL / URN: https://www.iit.cnr.it/qasa2013/
Kurzbeschreibung (Abstract):

We empirically evaluate interrupt-related covert channels, in short IRCCs, a type of covert channel that leverages hardware interrupts for communication. The evaluation is based on an exploit of IRCCs that we implemented as a proof-of-concept. We use a combination of experimental evaluation and information-theoretic analysis to compute the bandwidth of the channel on a concrete system. Our analysis shows a channel bandwidth of IRCCs based on interrupts of network interface cards (NICs) of approximately 5 bit/s. Besides the channel bandwidth, our experiments revealed previously unnoticed properties of IRCCs based on interrupts of NICs. While side channels based on hardware interrupts have been discussed before, this is the first experimental evaluation of covert channels based on hardware interrupts.

Freie Schlagworte: Security;reviewed
ID-Nummer: TUD-CS-2013-0199
Fachbereich(e)/-gebiet(e): 20 Fachbereich Informatik
20 Fachbereich Informatik > Datenbanken und Verteilte Systeme
20 Fachbereich Informatik > Modellierung und Analyse von Informationssystemen (MAIS)
20 Fachbereich Informatik > Systemsicherheit
20 Fachbereich Informatik > Ubiquitäre Wissensverarbeitung
Hinterlegungsdatum: 31 Dez 2016 09:57
Letzte Änderung: 20 Sep 2018 15:09
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