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Comparative Usability Evaluation of Cast-as-Intended Verification Approaches in Internet Voting

Marky, Karola and Kulyk, Oksana and Volkamer, Melanie
Langweg, Hanno and Meier, Michael and Witt, Bernhard C. and Reinhardt, Delphine (eds.) (2018):
Comparative Usability Evaluation of Cast-as-Intended Verification Approaches in Internet Voting.
In: SICHERHEIT 2018, Bonn, Gesellschaft für Informatik e.V., Konstanz, Germany, DOI: 10.18420/sicherheit2018_15,
[Online-Edition: https://dl.gi.de/handle/20.500.12116/16280],
[Conference or Workshop Item]

Abstract

Internet Voting promises benefits like the support for voters from abroad and an overall improved accessibility. But it is accompanied by security risks like the manipulation of votes by malware. Enabling the voters to verify that their voting device casts their intended votes is a possible solution to address such a manipulation - the so-called cast-as-intended verifiability. <br />Several different approaches for providing cast-as-intended verifiability have been proposed or put into practice. Each approach makes various assumptions about the voters' capabilities that are required in order to provide cast-as-intended verifiability. In this paper we investigate these assumptions of four chosen cast-as-intended approaches and report the impact if those are violated.<br />Our findings indicate that the assumptions of cast-as-intended approaches (e.g. voters being capable of comparing long strings) have an impact on the security of the Internet Voting systems. We discuss this impact and provide recommendations how to address the identified assumptions and give important directions in future research on usable and verifiable Internet Voting systems.

Item Type: Conference or Workshop Item
Erschienen: 2018
Editors: Langweg, Hanno and Meier, Michael and Witt, Bernhard C. and Reinhardt, Delphine
Creators: Marky, Karola and Kulyk, Oksana and Volkamer, Melanie
Title: Comparative Usability Evaluation of Cast-as-Intended Verification Approaches in Internet Voting
Language: English
Abstract:

Internet Voting promises benefits like the support for voters from abroad and an overall improved accessibility. But it is accompanied by security risks like the manipulation of votes by malware. Enabling the voters to verify that their voting device casts their intended votes is a possible solution to address such a manipulation - the so-called cast-as-intended verifiability. <br />Several different approaches for providing cast-as-intended verifiability have been proposed or put into practice. Each approach makes various assumptions about the voters' capabilities that are required in order to provide cast-as-intended verifiability. In this paper we investigate these assumptions of four chosen cast-as-intended approaches and report the impact if those are violated.<br />Our findings indicate that the assumptions of cast-as-intended approaches (e.g. voters being capable of comparing long strings) have an impact on the security of the Internet Voting systems. We discuss this impact and provide recommendations how to address the identified assumptions and give important directions in future research on usable and verifiable Internet Voting systems.

Title of Book: SICHERHEIT 2018
Place of Publication: Bonn
Publisher: Gesellschaft für Informatik e.V.
Uncontrolled Keywords: E-Voting, Cast-as-intended Verifiability, Usability Evaluation
Divisions: 20 Department of Computer Science
20 Department of Computer Science > SECUSO - Security, Usability and Society
Event Location: Konstanz, Germany
Date Deposited: 06 Feb 2018 15:26
DOI: 10.18420/sicherheit2018_15
Official URL: https://dl.gi.de/handle/20.500.12116/16280
Identification Number: TUD-CS-2018-0028
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