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HAFIX: Hardware-Assisted Flow Integrity Extension (Best Paper Award)

Arias, Orlando and Davi, Lucas and Hanreich, Matthias and Jin, Yier and Koeberl, Patrick and Paul, Debayan and Sadeghi, Ahmad-Reza and Sullivan, Dean (2015):
HAFIX: Hardware-Assisted Flow Integrity Extension (Best Paper Award).
In: 52nd Design Automation Conference (DAC), [Conference or Workshop Item]

Abstract

Code-reuse attacks like return-oriented programming (ROP) pose a severe threat to modern software on diverse processor architectures. Designing practical and secure defenses against code-reuse attacks is highly challenging and currently subject to intense research. However, no secure and practical system-level solutions exist so far, since a large number of proposed defenses have been successfully bypassed. To tackle this attack, we present HAFIX (Hardware-Assisted Flow Integrity eXtension), a defense against code-reuse attacks exploiting backward edges (returns). HAFIX provides fine-grained and practical protection, and serves as an enabling technology for future control-flow integrity instantiations. This paper presents the implementation and evaluation of HAFIX for the Intelr Siskiyou Peak and SPARC embedded system architectures, and demonstrates its security and efficiency in code-reuse protection while incurring only 2% performance overhead.

Item Type: Conference or Workshop Item
Erschienen: 2015
Creators: Arias, Orlando and Davi, Lucas and Hanreich, Matthias and Jin, Yier and Koeberl, Patrick and Paul, Debayan and Sadeghi, Ahmad-Reza and Sullivan, Dean
Title: HAFIX: Hardware-Assisted Flow Integrity Extension (Best Paper Award)
Language: Afar
Abstract:

Code-reuse attacks like return-oriented programming (ROP) pose a severe threat to modern software on diverse processor architectures. Designing practical and secure defenses against code-reuse attacks is highly challenging and currently subject to intense research. However, no secure and practical system-level solutions exist so far, since a large number of proposed defenses have been successfully bypassed. To tackle this attack, we present HAFIX (Hardware-Assisted Flow Integrity eXtension), a defense against code-reuse attacks exploiting backward edges (returns). HAFIX provides fine-grained and practical protection, and serves as an enabling technology for future control-flow integrity instantiations. This paper presents the implementation and evaluation of HAFIX for the Intelr Siskiyou Peak and SPARC embedded system architectures, and demonstrates its security and efficiency in code-reuse protection while incurring only 2% performance overhead.

Title of Book: 52nd Design Automation Conference (DAC)
Divisions: Profile Areas
Profile Areas > Cybersecurity (CYSEC)
Date Deposited: 30 Dec 2016 21:25
Identification Number: TUD-CS-2015-0105
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