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Incentive Contracts and Efficient Unemployment Benefits

Demougin, Dominique ; Helm, Carsten (2009)
Incentive Contracts and Efficient Unemployment Benefits.
Report, Erstveröffentlichung

Kurzbeschreibung (Abstract)

Several European countries have reformed their labor market institutions. Incentive effects of unemployment benefits have been an important aspect of these reforms. We analyze this issue in a principal-agent model, focusing on unemployment levels and labor productivity. In our model, a higher level of unemployment benefits improves the worker's position in wage bargaining, leading to stronger effort incentives and higher output. However, it also reduces incentives for labor market participation. Accordingly, there is a trade-off. We analyze how changes in the economic environment such as globalization and better educated workers affect this trade-off.

Typ des Eintrags: Report
Erschienen: 2009
Autor(en): Demougin, Dominique ; Helm, Carsten
Art des Eintrags: Erstveröffentlichung
Titel: Incentive Contracts and Efficient Unemployment Benefits
Sprache: Englisch
Publikationsjahr: 2009
Ort: Darmstadt
Reihe: Darmstadt Discussion Papers in Economics
Band einer Reihe: 191
URL / URN: http://tuprints.ulb.tu-darmstadt.de/4735/
Kurzbeschreibung (Abstract):

Several European countries have reformed their labor market institutions. Incentive effects of unemployment benefits have been an important aspect of these reforms. We analyze this issue in a principal-agent model, focusing on unemployment levels and labor productivity. In our model, a higher level of unemployment benefits improves the worker's position in wage bargaining, leading to stronger effort incentives and higher output. However, it also reduces incentives for labor market participation. Accordingly, there is a trade-off. We analyze how changes in the economic environment such as globalization and better educated workers affect this trade-off.

Freie Schlagworte: Unemployment benefits, incentive contracts, Nash bargaining, moral hazard, globalisation
URN: urn:nbn:de:tuda-tuprints-47352
Zusätzliche Informationen:

JEL - Classification : J65, D82, J41, E24; Erstellt März 2008

Sachgruppe der Dewey Dezimalklassifikatin (DDC): 300 Sozialwissenschaften > 330 Wirtschaft
Fachbereich(e)/-gebiet(e): 01 Fachbereich Rechts- und Wirtschaftswissenschaften
01 Fachbereich Rechts- und Wirtschaftswissenschaften > Volkswirtschaftliche Fachgebiete
01 Fachbereich Rechts- und Wirtschaftswissenschaften > Volkswirtschaftliche Fachgebiete > Angewandte Mikroökonomik und Institutionenökonomik
Hinterlegungsdatum: 31 Jan 2016 20:59
Letzte Änderung: 25 Okt 2023 09:56
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