Demougin, Dominique ; Helm, Carsten (2009)
Incentive Contracts and Efficient Unemployment Benefits.
Report, Erstveröffentlichung
Kurzbeschreibung (Abstract)
Several European countries have reformed their labor market institutions. Incentive effects of unemployment benefits have been an important aspect of these reforms. We analyze this issue in a principal-agent model, focusing on unemployment levels and labor productivity. In our model, a higher level of unemployment benefits improves the worker's position in wage bargaining, leading to stronger effort incentives and higher output. However, it also reduces incentives for labor market participation. Accordingly, there is a trade-off. We analyze how changes in the economic environment such as globalization and better educated workers affect this trade-off.
| Typ des Eintrags: | Report |
|---|---|
| Erschienen: | 2009 |
| Autor(en): | Demougin, Dominique ; Helm, Carsten |
| Art des Eintrags: | Erstveröffentlichung |
| Titel: | Incentive Contracts and Efficient Unemployment Benefits |
| Sprache: | Englisch |
| Publikationsjahr: | 2009 |
| Ort: | Darmstadt |
| Reihe: | Darmstadt Discussion Papers in Economics |
| Band einer Reihe: | 191 |
| URL / URN: | https://tuprints.ulb.tu-darmstadt.de/4735 |
| Zugehörige Links: | |
| Kurzbeschreibung (Abstract): | Several European countries have reformed their labor market institutions. Incentive effects of unemployment benefits have been an important aspect of these reforms. We analyze this issue in a principal-agent model, focusing on unemployment levels and labor productivity. In our model, a higher level of unemployment benefits improves the worker's position in wage bargaining, leading to stronger effort incentives and higher output. However, it also reduces incentives for labor market participation. Accordingly, there is a trade-off. We analyze how changes in the economic environment such as globalization and better educated workers affect this trade-off. |
| Freie Schlagworte: | Unemployment benefits, incentive contracts, Nash bargaining, moral hazard, globalisation |
| URN: | urn:nbn:de:tuda-tuprints-47352 |
| Zusätzliche Informationen: | JEL - Classification : J65, D82, J41, E24; Erstellt März 2008 |
| Sachgruppe der Dewey Dezimalklassifikatin (DDC): | 300 Sozialwissenschaften > 330 Wirtschaft |
| Fachbereich(e)/-gebiet(e): | 01 Fachbereich Rechts- und Wirtschaftswissenschaften 01 Fachbereich Rechts- und Wirtschaftswissenschaften > Volkswirtschaftliche Fachgebiete 01 Fachbereich Rechts- und Wirtschaftswissenschaften > Volkswirtschaftliche Fachgebiete > Angewandte Mikroökonomik und Institutionenökonomik |
| Hinterlegungsdatum: | 31 Jan 2016 20:59 |
| Letzte Änderung: | 09 Aug 2024 09:03 |
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