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Internal Attacks in Anonymous Publish-Subscribe P2P Overlays

Jörg, Daubert and Fischer, Mathias and Mühlhäuser, Max and Grube, Tim :
Internal Attacks in Anonymous Publish-Subscribe P2P Overlays.
In: International Conference on Networked Systems (NetSys). IEEE Computer Society
[Conference or Workshop Item] , (2015)

Abstract

Privacy, in particular anonymity, is desirable in Online Social Networks (OSNs) like Twitter, especially when considering the threat of political repression and censorship. P2P-based publish-subscribe is a well suited paradigm for OSN scenarios as users can publish and follow topics of interest. How- ever, anonymity in P2P-based publish-subscribe (pub-sub) has been hardly analyzed so far. Research on add-on anonymization systems such as Tor mostly focuses on large scale traffic analysis rather than malicious insiders. Therefore, we analyze colluding insider attackers in more detail that operate on the basis of timing information. For that, we model a generic anonymous pub-sub system, present an attacker model, and discuss timing attacks. We analyze these attacks by a realistic simulation model and discuss potential countermeasures. Our findings indicate that even few malicious insiders are capable to disclose a large number of participants, while an attacker using large amounts of colluding nodes achieves only minor additional improvements.

Item Type: Conference or Workshop Item
Erschienen: 2015
Creators: Jörg, Daubert and Fischer, Mathias and Mühlhäuser, Max and Grube, Tim
Title: Internal Attacks in Anonymous Publish-Subscribe P2P Overlays
Language: English
Abstract:

Privacy, in particular anonymity, is desirable in Online Social Networks (OSNs) like Twitter, especially when considering the threat of political repression and censorship. P2P-based publish-subscribe is a well suited paradigm for OSN scenarios as users can publish and follow topics of interest. How- ever, anonymity in P2P-based publish-subscribe (pub-sub) has been hardly analyzed so far. Research on add-on anonymization systems such as Tor mostly focuses on large scale traffic analysis rather than malicious insiders. Therefore, we analyze colluding insider attackers in more detail that operate on the basis of timing information. For that, we model a generic anonymous pub-sub system, present an attacker model, and discuss timing attacks. We analyze these attacks by a realistic simulation model and discuss potential countermeasures. Our findings indicate that even few malicious insiders are capable to disclose a large number of participants, while an attacker using large amounts of colluding nodes achieves only minor additional improvements.

Publisher: IEEE Computer Society
Divisions: Department of Computer Science
Department of Computer Science > Telecooperation
LOEWE
LOEWE > LOEWE-Zentren
LOEWE > LOEWE-Zentren > CASED – Center for Advanced Security Research Darmstadt
Event Title: International Conference on Networked Systems (NetSys)
Date Deposited: 26 Mar 2015 08:30
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