Demirel, Denise (2014)
Universally Verifiable Poll-Site Voting Schemes Providing Everlasting Privacy.
Technische Universität Darmstadt
Dissertation, Erstveröffentlichung
Kurzbeschreibung (Abstract)
Computer based voting brings up huge challenges for technology. On the one hand an electronic voting system has to be transparent enough to allow verification of its correct functioning; on the other hand, it must ensure that these verification procedures do not allow an attacker to violate voter privacy. Both requirements can be addressed by providing cryptographically secured voting receipts. Each voter cast his or her vote in encoded form and receives a copy of the recorded ballot as receipt. The voters can use these receipts to verify that their vote is contained in the input of the tally. Furthermore, the encoded votes are publicly processed, which allows voters and observers to check that the election outcome has been determined correctly. However, to provide a private and free election, no voter should be able to prove to someone else for whom he or she voted. This must not only be prevented during the election, but also afterwards for an indefinite period of time. Especially with respect to everlasting privacy this is not ensured by most verifiable voting systems. If the receipt contains, for instance, the voting decision encrypted using some public key cryptography, an attacker can determine the candidates selected as soon as the underlying computational problem has been solved for the key length chosen. In this work we provide a summary of privacy weaknesses that may arise in verifiable electronic poll-site voting systems, and we identify and solve open issues. More precisely, we concentrate on the following three questions: (1) How can we show correct anonymization of votes in an efficient and privacy preserving manner using a generic approach? (2) How can we introduce everlasting privacy to mixing and homomorphic tallying based voting schemes? (3) How can we reduce the amount of trust voters have to put in authorities regarding privacy? In electronic voting so-called reencryption mix-nets are used to anonymize votes. These mix-nets shuffles votes in a universally verifiable manner, i.e., they publish some audit information allowing voters and observers to verify that the votes came out as they went in. In practice, mostly generic verification procedures are used to show correctness of this process. However, many of them do not provide an adequate level of privacy. To address (1), we investigate several proposals and introduce a new protocol that combines existing approaches but improves them with respect to privacy and efficiency. Another drawback of mixing based voting schemes is that all implementations provide computational privacy only. We address (2) by presenting a mix-net that uses a homomorphic and unconditionally hiding commitment scheme to encode the votes and audit data, implying everlasting privacy. The correctness of the anonymization process is guaranteed with overwhelming probability, even if all authorities collaborate. An implication of our result is that many current voting systems that use mix-nets can be upgraded to everlasting privacy. Subsequently, we show that this protocol can be applied to Prêt à Voter and Split-Ballot imposing only minor changes to current implementations. The same approach is used to introduce everlasting privacy to homomorphic tallying based schemes. The votes are encoded with an unconditionally hiding commitment scheme, they are homomorphically tallied in public, and the result is decoded afterwards. To show that our solution can be applied to poll-site voting, we describe how the Scratch & Vote voting system can be improved using our tallying protocol. Again only minor changes to the classical scheme are necessary. To address (3), the approach of non-personalized receipts is analyzed. If the receipts handed out to the voters do not contain a link to their vote cast, they do not have to put their trust in authorities keeping this association secret. We introduce an electronic ballot box that generates non-personalized receipts using a process that is similar to the anonymization procedure carried out by mix-nets. The correctness of the receipt generation is universally verifiable. Furthermore, our approach improves on existing solutions with respect to correctness and privacy. Finally, we compare all voting systems that are improved in this work, highlight their advantages and disadvantages, and conclude with key issues for future work.
Typ des Eintrags: | Dissertation | ||||
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Erschienen: | 2014 | ||||
Autor(en): | Demirel, Denise | ||||
Art des Eintrags: | Erstveröffentlichung | ||||
Titel: | Universally Verifiable Poll-Site Voting Schemes Providing Everlasting Privacy | ||||
Sprache: | Englisch | ||||
Referenten: | Buchmann, Prof. Dr. Johannes ; van de Graaf, Prof. Dr. Jeroen | ||||
Publikationsjahr: | 2014 | ||||
Datum der mündlichen Prüfung: | 3 Dezember 2013 | ||||
URL / URN: | http://tuprints.ulb.tu-darmstadt.de/4019 | ||||
Kurzbeschreibung (Abstract): | Computer based voting brings up huge challenges for technology. On the one hand an electronic voting system has to be transparent enough to allow verification of its correct functioning; on the other hand, it must ensure that these verification procedures do not allow an attacker to violate voter privacy. Both requirements can be addressed by providing cryptographically secured voting receipts. Each voter cast his or her vote in encoded form and receives a copy of the recorded ballot as receipt. The voters can use these receipts to verify that their vote is contained in the input of the tally. Furthermore, the encoded votes are publicly processed, which allows voters and observers to check that the election outcome has been determined correctly. However, to provide a private and free election, no voter should be able to prove to someone else for whom he or she voted. This must not only be prevented during the election, but also afterwards for an indefinite period of time. Especially with respect to everlasting privacy this is not ensured by most verifiable voting systems. If the receipt contains, for instance, the voting decision encrypted using some public key cryptography, an attacker can determine the candidates selected as soon as the underlying computational problem has been solved for the key length chosen. In this work we provide a summary of privacy weaknesses that may arise in verifiable electronic poll-site voting systems, and we identify and solve open issues. More precisely, we concentrate on the following three questions: (1) How can we show correct anonymization of votes in an efficient and privacy preserving manner using a generic approach? (2) How can we introduce everlasting privacy to mixing and homomorphic tallying based voting schemes? (3) How can we reduce the amount of trust voters have to put in authorities regarding privacy? In electronic voting so-called reencryption mix-nets are used to anonymize votes. These mix-nets shuffles votes in a universally verifiable manner, i.e., they publish some audit information allowing voters and observers to verify that the votes came out as they went in. In practice, mostly generic verification procedures are used to show correctness of this process. However, many of them do not provide an adequate level of privacy. To address (1), we investigate several proposals and introduce a new protocol that combines existing approaches but improves them with respect to privacy and efficiency. Another drawback of mixing based voting schemes is that all implementations provide computational privacy only. We address (2) by presenting a mix-net that uses a homomorphic and unconditionally hiding commitment scheme to encode the votes and audit data, implying everlasting privacy. The correctness of the anonymization process is guaranteed with overwhelming probability, even if all authorities collaborate. An implication of our result is that many current voting systems that use mix-nets can be upgraded to everlasting privacy. Subsequently, we show that this protocol can be applied to Prêt à Voter and Split-Ballot imposing only minor changes to current implementations. The same approach is used to introduce everlasting privacy to homomorphic tallying based schemes. The votes are encoded with an unconditionally hiding commitment scheme, they are homomorphically tallied in public, and the result is decoded afterwards. To show that our solution can be applied to poll-site voting, we describe how the Scratch & Vote voting system can be improved using our tallying protocol. Again only minor changes to the classical scheme are necessary. To address (3), the approach of non-personalized receipts is analyzed. If the receipts handed out to the voters do not contain a link to their vote cast, they do not have to put their trust in authorities keeping this association secret. We introduce an electronic ballot box that generates non-personalized receipts using a process that is similar to the anonymization procedure carried out by mix-nets. The correctness of the receipt generation is universally verifiable. Furthermore, our approach improves on existing solutions with respect to correctness and privacy. Finally, we compare all voting systems that are improved in this work, highlight their advantages and disadvantages, and conclude with key issues for future work. |
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URN: | urn:nbn:de:tuda-tuprints-40193 | ||||
Sachgruppe der Dewey Dezimalklassifikatin (DDC): | 000 Allgemeines, Informatik, Informationswissenschaft > 004 Informatik | ||||
Fachbereich(e)/-gebiet(e): | 20 Fachbereich Informatik 20 Fachbereich Informatik > Theoretische Informatik - Kryptographie und Computeralgebra |
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Hinterlegungsdatum: | 29 Jun 2014 19:55 | ||||
Letzte Änderung: | 29 Jun 2014 19:55 | ||||
PPN: | |||||
Referenten: | Buchmann, Prof. Dr. Johannes ; van de Graaf, Prof. Dr. Jeroen | ||||
Datum der mündlichen Prüfung / Verteidigung / mdl. Prüfung: | 3 Dezember 2013 | ||||
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