Rückert, Markus (2011)
Lattice-based Signature Schemes with Additional Features.
Technische Universität Darmstadt
Dissertation, Erstveröffentlichung
Kurzbeschreibung (Abstract)
Building cryptographic schemes upon as many fundamentally different hard problems as possible, seems to be the best way to hedge against future threats such as quantum computers. Being mainly based on the hardness of factoring and computing discrete logarithms, the present security landscape is at risk. In contrast, problems in lattices, such as finding short non-zero vectors, seem to withstand quantum computer attacks and the best known algorithms run in exponential time. In sharp contrast to other fields of cryptography, lattices admit a worst-case to average-case reduction (Ajtai 1996). Instead of assuming that a problem is hard for randomly chosen instances, lattice-based cryptosystems merely require the existence of a single hard instance, i.e., hardness in the worst case. With such an additional "trust anchor", the resulting security guarantees are much more plausible. Quite recently, we have seen an increased interest in lattice-based cryptography with many striking results. In this thesis, we are particularly interested in signature schemes, which provide a supporting pillar for today's economy. While we have seen basic signature schemes from lattices, e.g., (Gentry, Peikert, Vaikuntanathan 2008), (Lyubashevsky, Micciancio 2008), (Lyubashevsky 2009), or (Cash, Hofheinz, Kiltz, Peikert 2009), there are hardly any results dealing with the specific needs of applications, where ordinary signatures often fall too short. In this thesis, we build upon the above results and equip them with additional features, motivated by an exemplary selection of application scenarios. Hence, we demonstrate the great versatility of lattices in cryptography. In particular, we facilitate privacy-friendly electronic elections, fair online contract signing, signature compression, secure signatures in the strongest sense, as well as identity-based primitives. As far as possible, we avoid simplifying assumptions, such as the random oracle model. We believe that our techniques can be transferred to other application scenarios as well. Independently of the these results, we discuss the practical hardness of lattice problems and provide a framework for estimating the security of essentially all modern lattice-based cryptography.
| Typ des Eintrags: | Dissertation | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Erschienen: | 2011 | ||||
| Autor(en): | Rückert, Markus | ||||
| Art des Eintrags: | Erstveröffentlichung | ||||
| Titel: | Lattice-based Signature Schemes with Additional Features | ||||
| Sprache: | Englisch | ||||
| Referenten: | Buchmann, Prof. Dr. Johannes ; Micciancio, Prof. Dr. Daniele | ||||
| Publikationsjahr: | 13 Januar 2011 | ||||
| Datum der mündlichen Prüfung: | 20 Dezember 2010 | ||||
| URL / URN: | urn:nbn:de:tuda-tuprints-23939 | ||||
| Zugehörige Links: | |||||
| Kurzbeschreibung (Abstract): | Building cryptographic schemes upon as many fundamentally different hard problems as possible, seems to be the best way to hedge against future threats such as quantum computers. Being mainly based on the hardness of factoring and computing discrete logarithms, the present security landscape is at risk. In contrast, problems in lattices, such as finding short non-zero vectors, seem to withstand quantum computer attacks and the best known algorithms run in exponential time. In sharp contrast to other fields of cryptography, lattices admit a worst-case to average-case reduction (Ajtai 1996). Instead of assuming that a problem is hard for randomly chosen instances, lattice-based cryptosystems merely require the existence of a single hard instance, i.e., hardness in the worst case. With such an additional "trust anchor", the resulting security guarantees are much more plausible. Quite recently, we have seen an increased interest in lattice-based cryptography with many striking results. In this thesis, we are particularly interested in signature schemes, which provide a supporting pillar for today's economy. While we have seen basic signature schemes from lattices, e.g., (Gentry, Peikert, Vaikuntanathan 2008), (Lyubashevsky, Micciancio 2008), (Lyubashevsky 2009), or (Cash, Hofheinz, Kiltz, Peikert 2009), there are hardly any results dealing with the specific needs of applications, where ordinary signatures often fall too short. In this thesis, we build upon the above results and equip them with additional features, motivated by an exemplary selection of application scenarios. Hence, we demonstrate the great versatility of lattices in cryptography. In particular, we facilitate privacy-friendly electronic elections, fair online contract signing, signature compression, secure signatures in the strongest sense, as well as identity-based primitives. As far as possible, we avoid simplifying assumptions, such as the random oracle model. We believe that our techniques can be transferred to other application scenarios as well. Independently of the these results, we discuss the practical hardness of lattice problems and provide a framework for estimating the security of essentially all modern lattice-based cryptography. |
||||
| Alternatives oder übersetztes Abstract: |
|
||||
| Freie Schlagworte: | Lattice-based Cryptography, Blind Signatures, Verifiably Encrypted Signatures, Cryptanalysis, Digital Signatures, Identity-based Cryptography | ||||
| Sachgruppe der Dewey Dezimalklassifikatin (DDC): | 000 Allgemeines, Informatik, Informationswissenschaft > 004 Informatik 500 Naturwissenschaften und Mathematik > 510 Mathematik |
||||
| Fachbereich(e)/-gebiet(e): | 20 Fachbereich Informatik > Theoretische Informatik - Kryptographie und Computeralgebra 20 Fachbereich Informatik |
||||
| Hinterlegungsdatum: | 17 Jan 2011 10:36 | ||||
| Letzte Änderung: | 05 Mär 2013 09:44 | ||||
| PPN: | |||||
| Referenten: | Buchmann, Prof. Dr. Johannes ; Micciancio, Prof. Dr. Daniele | ||||
| Datum der mündlichen Prüfung / Verteidigung / mdl. Prüfung: | 20 Dezember 2010 | ||||
| Export: | |||||
| Suche nach Titel in: | TUfind oder in Google | ||||
 |
Frage zum Eintrag |
Optionen (nur für Redakteure)
 |
Redaktionelle Details anzeigen |
Drucken
Impressum