Souris, Antonios ; Stecker, Christian ; Jungjohann, Arne (2023)
Two steps forward, one step back? Party competition, cooperative federalism, and transport policy reforms in Germany.
In: Energy, Sustainability and Society, 13 (1)
doi: 10.1186/s13705-023-00399-z
Artikel, Bibliographie
Dies ist die neueste Version dieses Eintrags.
Kurzbeschreibung (Abstract)
Background: Transport policy has regained political relevance in Germany. The successful realization of the Verkehrswende,—the extensive transition toward sustainable transport and mobility—is central to reaching climate neutrality. In 2020, the Federal Government proposed the reform of two key ordinances that have regulated road traffic so far. The amendment was aimed at implementing several provisions at the expense of car drivers and, at the same time, in favor of cyclists and pedestrians. Due to cooperative federalism, the governments of the 16 constituent units (Länder) had to adopt the amendment in the Bundesrat, Germany’s second chamber. In the legislative process, however, the reform ultimately failed in its original scope. Using it as a particularly instructive case study, we show how and why party competition and cooperative federalism hamper comprehensive transport policy reforms in Germany.
Results: In the German political system, political interests interact within a complex web of cooperative federalism. To understand partisan encroachment on the federal decision-making processes, this paper uses a process-tracing approach. To investigate decision-making in the Bundesrat and its outcomes, the empirical analysis combines qualitative analyses of several publicly available sources. We can empirically demonstrate that political parties influenced legislative procedures. The reform failed in its original scope because the three political parties with veto power in the Bundesrat insisted on their positions and were not willing to agree on a compromise.
Conclusions: For the implementation of the Verkehrswende, the German federal system proves to be both a blessing and a curse. On one hand, the institutional design of the Bundesrat constrains extreme positions and helps promote decisions most citizens may agree with. The Länder governments and administrations can also contribute their expertise and local experience to federal legislation via the Bundesrat. On the other hand, veto powers are ubiquitous in the German system of cooperative federalism. Therefore, it is prone to blockades. The actions of the political parties in the Bundesrat have hampered the comprehensive reform of road traffic regulations that was originally envisaged. Policymaking took two steps forward toward implementing the Verkehrswende, only to immediately take one step back again.
Typ des Eintrags: | Artikel |
---|---|
Erschienen: | 2023 |
Autor(en): | Souris, Antonios ; Stecker, Christian ; Jungjohann, Arne |
Art des Eintrags: | Bibliographie |
Titel: | Two steps forward, one step back? Party competition, cooperative federalism, and transport policy reforms in Germany |
Sprache: | Englisch |
Publikationsjahr: | 12 Juni 2023 |
Ort: | Berlin ; Heidelberg |
Verlag: | BMC : Part of Springer Nature |
Titel der Zeitschrift, Zeitung oder Schriftenreihe: | Energy, Sustainability and Society |
Jahrgang/Volume einer Zeitschrift: | 13 |
(Heft-)Nummer: | 1 |
Kollation: | 11 Seiten |
DOI: | 10.1186/s13705-023-00399-z |
Zugehörige Links: | |
Kurzbeschreibung (Abstract): | Background: Transport policy has regained political relevance in Germany. The successful realization of the Verkehrswende,—the extensive transition toward sustainable transport and mobility—is central to reaching climate neutrality. In 2020, the Federal Government proposed the reform of two key ordinances that have regulated road traffic so far. The amendment was aimed at implementing several provisions at the expense of car drivers and, at the same time, in favor of cyclists and pedestrians. Due to cooperative federalism, the governments of the 16 constituent units (Länder) had to adopt the amendment in the Bundesrat, Germany’s second chamber. In the legislative process, however, the reform ultimately failed in its original scope. Using it as a particularly instructive case study, we show how and why party competition and cooperative federalism hamper comprehensive transport policy reforms in Germany. Results: In the German political system, political interests interact within a complex web of cooperative federalism. To understand partisan encroachment on the federal decision-making processes, this paper uses a process-tracing approach. To investigate decision-making in the Bundesrat and its outcomes, the empirical analysis combines qualitative analyses of several publicly available sources. We can empirically demonstrate that political parties influenced legislative procedures. The reform failed in its original scope because the three political parties with veto power in the Bundesrat insisted on their positions and were not willing to agree on a compromise. Conclusions: For the implementation of the Verkehrswende, the German federal system proves to be both a blessing and a curse. On one hand, the institutional design of the Bundesrat constrains extreme positions and helps promote decisions most citizens may agree with. The Länder governments and administrations can also contribute their expertise and local experience to federal legislation via the Bundesrat. On the other hand, veto powers are ubiquitous in the German system of cooperative federalism. Therefore, it is prone to blockades. The actions of the political parties in the Bundesrat have hampered the comprehensive reform of road traffic regulations that was originally envisaged. Policymaking took two steps forward toward implementing the Verkehrswende, only to immediately take one step back again. |
Freie Schlagworte: | Mobility policy, Transport policy, Verkehrswende, Bundesrat, Political parties, Cooperative federalism, Process-tracing |
ID-Nummer: | Artikel-ID: 20 |
Zusätzliche Informationen: | Collection: Sustainable Mobility Transitions: (New) Pathways of Future Energy Systems |
Sachgruppe der Dewey Dezimalklassifikatin (DDC): | 300 Sozialwissenschaften > 320 Politik 300 Sozialwissenschaften > 333.7 Natürliche Ressourcen, Energie und Umwelt |
Fachbereich(e)/-gebiet(e): | 02 Fachbereich Gesellschafts- und Geschichtswissenschaften 02 Fachbereich Gesellschafts- und Geschichtswissenschaften > Institut für Politikwissenschaft 02 Fachbereich Gesellschafts- und Geschichtswissenschaften > Institut für Politikwissenschaft > Politisches System der BRD und Vergleich politischer Systeme |
Hinterlegungsdatum: | 19 Jan 2025 22:15 |
Letzte Änderung: | 19 Jan 2025 22:15 |
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Verfügbare Versionen dieses Eintrags
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Two steps forward, one step back? Party competition, cooperative federalism, and transport policy reforms in Germany. (deposited 14 Jan 2025 09:43)
- Two steps forward, one step back? Party competition, cooperative federalism, and transport policy reforms in Germany. (deposited 19 Jan 2025 22:15) [Gegenwärtig angezeigt]
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