Das, Poulami ; Erwig, Andreas ; Struck, Patrick ; Meyer, Michael (2024)
Efficient Post-Quantum Secure Deterministic Threshold Wallets from Isogenies.
19th ACM Asia Conference on Computer and Communications Security. Singapore (01.07.2024 - 05.07.2024)
doi: 10.1145/3634737.3657008
Konferenzveröffentlichung, Bibliographie
Kurzbeschreibung (Abstract)
Cryptocurrency networks crucially rely on digital signature schemes, which are used as an authentication mechanism for transactions. Unfortunately, most major cryptocurren- cies today, including Bitcoin and Ethereum, employ signature schemes that are susceptible to quantum adversaries, i.e., an adversary with access to a quantum computer can forge signatures and thereby spend coins of honest users. In cryptocurrency networks, signa- ture schemes are typically not executed in isolation, but within a so-called cryptographic wallet. In order to achieve security against quantum adversaries, the signature scheme and the cryptographic wallet must withstand quantum attacks. In this work, we advance the study on post-quantum secure signature and wallet schemes. That is, we provide the first formal model for deterministic threshold wallets and we show a generic post-quantum secure construction from any post-quantum secure threshold signature scheme with rerandomizable keys. We then instantiate our construc- tion from the isogeny-based signature scheme CSI-FiSh and we show that our instantiation significantly improves over prior work.
Typ des Eintrags: | Konferenzveröffentlichung |
---|---|
Erschienen: | 2024 |
Autor(en): | Das, Poulami ; Erwig, Andreas ; Struck, Patrick ; Meyer, Michael |
Art des Eintrags: | Bibliographie |
Titel: | Efficient Post-Quantum Secure Deterministic Threshold Wallets from Isogenies |
Sprache: | Englisch |
Publikationsjahr: | 1 Juli 2024 |
Verlag: | ACM |
Buchtitel: | ASIA CCS'24: Proceedings of the 19th ACM Asia Conference on Computer and Communications Security |
Veranstaltungstitel: | 19th ACM Asia Conference on Computer and Communications Security |
Veranstaltungsort: | Singapore |
Veranstaltungsdatum: | 01.07.2024 - 05.07.2024 |
DOI: | 10.1145/3634737.3657008 |
Kurzbeschreibung (Abstract): | Cryptocurrency networks crucially rely on digital signature schemes, which are used as an authentication mechanism for transactions. Unfortunately, most major cryptocurren- cies today, including Bitcoin and Ethereum, employ signature schemes that are susceptible to quantum adversaries, i.e., an adversary with access to a quantum computer can forge signatures and thereby spend coins of honest users. In cryptocurrency networks, signa- ture schemes are typically not executed in isolation, but within a so-called cryptographic wallet. In order to achieve security against quantum adversaries, the signature scheme and the cryptographic wallet must withstand quantum attacks. In this work, we advance the study on post-quantum secure signature and wallet schemes. That is, we provide the first formal model for deterministic threshold wallets and we show a generic post-quantum secure construction from any post-quantum secure threshold signature scheme with rerandomizable keys. We then instantiate our construc- tion from the isogeny-based signature scheme CSI-FiSh and we show that our instantiation significantly improves over prior work. |
Freie Schlagworte: | P1, S7 |
Fachbereich(e)/-gebiet(e): | 20 Fachbereich Informatik 20 Fachbereich Informatik > QPC - Quantum and Physical attack resistant Cryptography 20 Fachbereich Informatik > Telekooperation DFG-Sonderforschungsbereiche (inkl. Transregio) DFG-Sonderforschungsbereiche (inkl. Transregio) > Sonderforschungsbereiche DFG-Graduiertenkollegs DFG-Graduiertenkollegs > Graduiertenkolleg 2050 Privacy and Trust for Mobile Users DFG-Sonderforschungsbereiche (inkl. Transregio) > Sonderforschungsbereiche > SFB 1119: CROSSING – Kryptographiebasierte Sicherheitslösungen als Grundlage für Vertrauen in heutigen und zukünftigen IT-Systemen |
Hinterlegungsdatum: | 25 Okt 2024 14:04 |
Letzte Änderung: | 25 Okt 2024 14:04 |
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