Herrmann, Dominik ; Maass, Max ; Federrath, Hannes (2014)
Evaluating the Security of a DNS Query Obfuscation Scheme for Private Web Surfing.
29th IFIP TC 11 International Conference, SEC 2014. Marrakech, Morocco (02.-04.06.2014)
doi: 10.1007/978-3-642-55415-5_17
Konferenzveröffentlichung, Bibliographie
Dies ist die neueste Version dieses Eintrags.
Kurzbeschreibung (Abstract)
The Domain Name System (DNS) does not provide query privacy. Query obfuscation schemes have been proposed to overcome this limitation, but, so far, they have not been evaluated in a realistic setting. In this paper we evaluate the security of a random set range query scheme in a real-world web surfing scenario. We demonstrate that the scheme does not sufficiently obfuscate characteristic query patterns, which can be used by an adversary to determine the visited websites. We also illustrate how to thwart the attack and discuss practical challenges. Our results suggest that previously published evaluations of range queries may give a false sense of the attainable security, because they do not account for any interdependencies between queries.
Typ des Eintrags: | Konferenzveröffentlichung |
---|---|
Erschienen: | 2014 |
Autor(en): | Herrmann, Dominik ; Maass, Max ; Federrath, Hannes |
Art des Eintrags: | Bibliographie |
Titel: | Evaluating the Security of a DNS Query Obfuscation Scheme for Private Web Surfing |
Sprache: | Englisch |
Publikationsjahr: | 2014 |
Ort: | Darmstadt |
Verlag: | Springer Berlin Heidelberg |
Buchtitel: | ICT Systems Security and Privacy Protection |
Kollation: | 16 Seiten |
Veranstaltungstitel: | 29th IFIP TC 11 International Conference, SEC 2014 |
Veranstaltungsort: | Marrakech, Morocco |
Veranstaltungsdatum: | 02.-04.06.2014 |
DOI: | 10.1007/978-3-642-55415-5_17 |
Zugehörige Links: | |
Kurzbeschreibung (Abstract): | The Domain Name System (DNS) does not provide query privacy. Query obfuscation schemes have been proposed to overcome this limitation, but, so far, they have not been evaluated in a realistic setting. In this paper we evaluate the security of a random set range query scheme in a real-world web surfing scenario. We demonstrate that the scheme does not sufficiently obfuscate characteristic query patterns, which can be used by an adversary to determine the visited websites. We also illustrate how to thwart the attack and discuss practical challenges. Our results suggest that previously published evaluations of range queries may give a false sense of the attainable security, because they do not account for any interdependencies between queries. |
Freie Schlagworte: | Block Size, Range Query, Domain Name System, Query Pattern, Pattern Length |
Sachgruppe der Dewey Dezimalklassifikatin (DDC): | 000 Allgemeines, Informatik, Informationswissenschaft > 004 Informatik |
Fachbereich(e)/-gebiet(e): | 20 Fachbereich Informatik 20 Fachbereich Informatik > Sichere Mobile Netze |
Hinterlegungsdatum: | 02 Aug 2024 12:42 |
Letzte Änderung: | 02 Aug 2024 12:42 |
PPN: | |
Export: | |
Suche nach Titel in: | TUfind oder in Google |
Verfügbare Versionen dieses Eintrags
-
Evaluating the Security of a DNS Query Obfuscation Scheme for Private Web Surfing. (deposited 29 Jul 2022 14:44)
- Evaluating the Security of a DNS Query Obfuscation Scheme for Private Web Surfing. (deposited 02 Aug 2024 12:42) [Gegenwärtig angezeigt]
Frage zum Eintrag |
Optionen (nur für Redakteure)
Redaktionelle Details anzeigen |