Muth, Philipp ; Geihs, Matthias ; Arul, Tolga ; Buchmann, Johannes ; Katzenbeisser, Stefan (2020)
ELSA: efficient long-term secure storage of large datasets (full version).
In: EURASIP Journal on Information Security, 2020 (9)
doi: 10.1186/s13635-020-00108-9
Artikel, Bibliographie
Dies ist die neueste Version dieses Eintrags.
Kurzbeschreibung (Abstract)
An increasing amount of information today is generated, exchanged, and stored digitally. This also includes long-lived and highly sensitive information (e.g., electronic health records, governmental documents) whose integrity and confidentiality must be protected over decades or even centuries. While there is a vast amount of cryptography-based data protection schemes, only few are designed for long-term protection. Recently, Braun et al. (AsiaCCS’17) proposed the first long-term protection scheme that provides renewable integrity protection and information-theoretic confidentiality protection. However, computation and storage costs of their scheme increase significantly with the number of stored data items. As a result, their scheme appears suitable only for protecting databases with a small number of relatively large data items, but unsuitable for databases that hold a large number of relatively small data items (e.g., medical record databases). In this work, we present a solution for efficient long-term integrity and confidentiality protection of large datasets consisting of relatively small data items. First, we construct a renewable vector commitment scheme that is information-theoretically hiding under selective decommitment. We then combine this scheme with renewable timestamps and information-theoretically secure secret sharing. The resulting solution requires only a single timestamp for protecting a dataset while the state of the art requires a number of timestamps linear in the number of data items. Furthermore, we extend the scheme, that supports a single client, to a multi-client setting. Subsequently, we characterize the arising challenges with respect to integrity and confidentiality and discuss how our multi-client scheme tackles them. We implemented our solution and measured its performance in a scenario where 9600 data items are aggregated, stored, protected, and verified over a time span of 80 years. Our measurements show that our new solution completes this evaluation scenario an order of magnitude faster than the state of the art.
Typ des Eintrags: | Artikel |
---|---|
Erschienen: | 2020 |
Autor(en): | Muth, Philipp ; Geihs, Matthias ; Arul, Tolga ; Buchmann, Johannes ; Katzenbeisser, Stefan |
Art des Eintrags: | Bibliographie |
Titel: | ELSA: efficient long-term secure storage of large datasets (full version) |
Sprache: | Englisch |
Publikationsjahr: | 2020 |
Verlag: | Springer |
Titel der Zeitschrift, Zeitung oder Schriftenreihe: | EURASIP Journal on Information Security |
Jahrgang/Volume einer Zeitschrift: | 2020 |
(Heft-)Nummer: | 9 |
DOI: | 10.1186/s13635-020-00108-9 |
Zugehörige Links: | |
Kurzbeschreibung (Abstract): | An increasing amount of information today is generated, exchanged, and stored digitally. This also includes long-lived and highly sensitive information (e.g., electronic health records, governmental documents) whose integrity and confidentiality must be protected over decades or even centuries. While there is a vast amount of cryptography-based data protection schemes, only few are designed for long-term protection. Recently, Braun et al. (AsiaCCS’17) proposed the first long-term protection scheme that provides renewable integrity protection and information-theoretic confidentiality protection. However, computation and storage costs of their scheme increase significantly with the number of stored data items. As a result, their scheme appears suitable only for protecting databases with a small number of relatively large data items, but unsuitable for databases that hold a large number of relatively small data items (e.g., medical record databases). In this work, we present a solution for efficient long-term integrity and confidentiality protection of large datasets consisting of relatively small data items. First, we construct a renewable vector commitment scheme that is information-theoretically hiding under selective decommitment. We then combine this scheme with renewable timestamps and information-theoretically secure secret sharing. The resulting solution requires only a single timestamp for protecting a dataset while the state of the art requires a number of timestamps linear in the number of data items. Furthermore, we extend the scheme, that supports a single client, to a multi-client setting. Subsequently, we characterize the arising challenges with respect to integrity and confidentiality and discuss how our multi-client scheme tackles them. We implemented our solution and measured its performance in a scenario where 9600 data items are aggregated, stored, protected, and verified over a time span of 80 years. Our measurements show that our new solution completes this evaluation scenario an order of magnitude faster than the state of the art. |
Freie Schlagworte: | Solutions, S6 |
Sachgruppe der Dewey Dezimalklassifikatin (DDC): | 000 Allgemeines, Informatik, Informationswissenschaft > 004 Informatik |
Fachbereich(e)/-gebiet(e): | 20 Fachbereich Informatik 20 Fachbereich Informatik > Security Engineering DFG-Sonderforschungsbereiche (inkl. Transregio) DFG-Sonderforschungsbereiche (inkl. Transregio) > Sonderforschungsbereiche DFG-Sonderforschungsbereiche (inkl. Transregio) > Sonderforschungsbereiche > SFB 1119: CROSSING – Kryptographiebasierte Sicherheitslösungen als Grundlage für Vertrauen in heutigen und zukünftigen IT-Systemen |
Hinterlegungsdatum: | 02 Jul 2024 23:13 |
Letzte Änderung: | 02 Jul 2024 23:13 |
PPN: | |
Export: | |
Suche nach Titel in: | TUfind oder in Google |
Verfügbare Versionen dieses Eintrags
-
ELSA: efficient long-term secure storage of large datasets (full version). (deposited 09 Feb 2021 09:34)
- ELSA: efficient long-term secure storage of large datasets (full version). (deposited 02 Jul 2024 23:13) [Gegenwärtig angezeigt]
![]() |
Frage zum Eintrag |
Optionen (nur für Redakteure)
![]() |
Redaktionelle Details anzeigen |