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Mitigating Intersection Attacks in Anonymous Microblogging

Gaballah, Sarah Abdelwahab ; Nguyen, Thanh Hoang Long ; Abdullah, Lamya ; Zimmer, Ephraim ; Mühlhäuser, Max (2023)
Mitigating Intersection Attacks in Anonymous Microblogging.
18th International Conference on Availability, Reliability and Security. Benevento, Italy (29.08.-01.09.2023)
doi: 10.1145/3600160.3600166
Konferenzveröffentlichung, Bibliographie

Kurzbeschreibung (Abstract)

Anonymous microblogging systems are known to be vulnerable to intersection attacks due to network churn. An adversary that monitors all communications can leverage the churn to learn who is publishing what with increasing confidence over time. In this paper, we propose a protocol for mitigating intersection attacks in anonymous microblogging systems by grouping users into anonymity sets based on similarities in their publishing behavior. The protocol provides a configurable communication schedule for users in each set to manage the inevitable trade-off between latency and bandwidth overhead. In our evaluation, we use real-world datasets from two popular microblogging platforms, Twitter and Reddit, to simulate user publishing behavior. The results demonstrate that the protocol can protect users against intersection attacks at low bandwidth overhead when the users adhere to communication schedules. In addition, the protocol can sustain a slow degradation in the size of the anonymity set over time under various churn rates.

Typ des Eintrags: Konferenzveröffentlichung
Erschienen: 2023
Autor(en): Gaballah, Sarah Abdelwahab ; Nguyen, Thanh Hoang Long ; Abdullah, Lamya ; Zimmer, Ephraim ; Mühlhäuser, Max
Art des Eintrags: Bibliographie
Titel: Mitigating Intersection Attacks in Anonymous Microblogging
Sprache: Englisch
Publikationsjahr: 29 August 2023
Verlag: ACM
Buchtitel: ARES '23: Proceedings of the 18th International Conference on Availability, Reliability and Security
Veranstaltungstitel: 18th International Conference on Availability, Reliability and Security
Veranstaltungsort: Benevento, Italy
Veranstaltungsdatum: 29.08.-01.09.2023
DOI: 10.1145/3600160.3600166
URL / URN: https://dl.acm.org/doi/abs/10.1145/3600160.3600166
Kurzbeschreibung (Abstract):

Anonymous microblogging systems are known to be vulnerable to intersection attacks due to network churn. An adversary that monitors all communications can leverage the churn to learn who is publishing what with increasing confidence over time. In this paper, we propose a protocol for mitigating intersection attacks in anonymous microblogging systems by grouping users into anonymity sets based on similarities in their publishing behavior. The protocol provides a configurable communication schedule for users in each set to manage the inevitable trade-off between latency and bandwidth overhead. In our evaluation, we use real-world datasets from two popular microblogging platforms, Twitter and Reddit, to simulate user publishing behavior. The results demonstrate that the protocol can protect users against intersection attacks at low bandwidth overhead when the users adhere to communication schedules. In addition, the protocol can sustain a slow degradation in the size of the anonymity set over time under various churn rates.

Freie Schlagworte: Network security, Anonymity, Microblogging
Fachbereich(e)/-gebiet(e): 20 Fachbereich Informatik
20 Fachbereich Informatik > Telekooperation
Hinterlegungsdatum: 28 Sep 2023 13:47
Letzte Änderung: 24 Okt 2023 10:23
PPN: 512662533
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