Brian, Gianluca ; Faust, Sebastian ; Micheli, Elena ; Venturi, Daniele (2022)
Continuously Non-malleable Codes Against Bounded-Depth Tampering.
28th International Conference on the Theory and Application of Cryptology and Information Security. Taipei, Taiwan (05.-09.12.2022)
doi: 10.1007/978-3-031-22972-5_14
Konferenzveröffentlichung, Bibliographie
Kurzbeschreibung (Abstract)
Non-malleable codes (Dziembowski, Pietrzak and Wichs, ICS 2010 & JACM 2018) allow protecting arbitrary cryptographic primitives against related-key attacks (RKAs). Even when using codes that are guaranteed to be non-malleable against a single tampering attempt, one obtains RKA security against poly-many tampering attacks at the price of assuming perfect memory erasures. In contrast, continuously non-malleable codes (Faust, Mukherjee, Nielsen and Venturi, TCC 2014) do not suffer from this limitation, as the non-malleability guarantee holds against poly-many tampering attempts. Unfortunately, there are only a handful of constructions of continuously non-malleable codes, while standard non-malleable codes are known for a large variety of tampering families including, e.g., NC0 and decision-tree tampering, AC0, and recently even bounded polynomial-depth tampering. We change this state of affairs by providing the first constructions of continuously non-malleable codes in the following natural settings:
- Against decision-tree tampering, where, in each tampering attempt, every bit of the tampered codeword can be set arbitrarily after adaptively reading up to d locations within the input codeword. Our scheme is in the plain model, can be instantiated assuming the existence of one-way functions, and tolerates tampering by decision trees of depth � = � ( � 1 / 8 ) , where n is the length of the codeword. Notably, this class includes NC0.
- Against bounded polynomial-depth tampering, where in each tampering attempt the adversary can select any tampering function that can be computed by a circuit of bounded polynomial depth (and unbounded polynomial size). Our scheme is in the common reference string model, and can be instantiated assuming the existence of time-lock puzzles and simulation-extractable (succinct) non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs.
| Typ des Eintrags: | Konferenzveröffentlichung |
|---|---|
| Erschienen: | 2022 |
| Autor(en): | Brian, Gianluca ; Faust, Sebastian ; Micheli, Elena ; Venturi, Daniele |
| Art des Eintrags: | Bibliographie |
| Titel: | Continuously Non-malleable Codes Against Bounded-Depth Tampering |
| Sprache: | Englisch |
| Publikationsjahr: | 10 Januar 2022 |
| Verlag: | Springer |
| Buchtitel: | Advances in Cryptology - ASIACRYPT 2022 |
| Reihe: | Lecture Notes in Computer Science |
| Band einer Reihe: | 13794 |
| Veranstaltungstitel: | 28th International Conference on the Theory and Application of Cryptology and Information Security |
| Veranstaltungsort: | Taipei, Taiwan |
| Veranstaltungsdatum: | 05.-09.12.2022 |
| DOI: | 10.1007/978-3-031-22972-5_14 |
| URL / URN: | https://dl.acm.org/doi/proceedings/10.1007/978-3-031-22972-5 |
| Zugehörige Links: | |
| Kurzbeschreibung (Abstract): | Non-malleable codes (Dziembowski, Pietrzak and Wichs, ICS 2010 & JACM 2018) allow protecting arbitrary cryptographic primitives against related-key attacks (RKAs). Even when using codes that are guaranteed to be non-malleable against a single tampering attempt, one obtains RKA security against poly-many tampering attacks at the price of assuming perfect memory erasures. In contrast, continuously non-malleable codes (Faust, Mukherjee, Nielsen and Venturi, TCC 2014) do not suffer from this limitation, as the non-malleability guarantee holds against poly-many tampering attempts. Unfortunately, there are only a handful of constructions of continuously non-malleable codes, while standard non-malleable codes are known for a large variety of tampering families including, e.g., NC0 and decision-tree tampering, AC0, and recently even bounded polynomial-depth tampering. We change this state of affairs by providing the first constructions of continuously non-malleable codes in the following natural settings: - Against decision-tree tampering, where, in each tampering attempt, every bit of the tampered codeword can be set arbitrarily after adaptively reading up to d locations within the input codeword. Our scheme is in the plain model, can be instantiated assuming the existence of one-way functions, and tolerates tampering by decision trees of depth � = � ( � 1 / 8 ) , where n is the length of the codeword. Notably, this class includes NC0. - Against bounded polynomial-depth tampering, where in each tampering attempt the adversary can select any tampering function that can be computed by a circuit of bounded polynomial depth (and unbounded polynomial size). Our scheme is in the common reference string model, and can be instantiated assuming the existence of time-lock puzzles and simulation-extractable (succinct) non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs. |
| Freie Schlagworte: | Applied Cryptography, CAC, Solutions, S7 |
| Fachbereich(e)/-gebiet(e): | 20 Fachbereich Informatik 20 Fachbereich Informatik > Angewandte Kryptographie DFG-Sonderforschungsbereiche (inkl. Transregio) DFG-Sonderforschungsbereiche (inkl. Transregio) > Sonderforschungsbereiche DFG-Sonderforschungsbereiche (inkl. Transregio) > Sonderforschungsbereiche > SFB 1119: CROSSING – Kryptographiebasierte Sicherheitslösungen als Grundlage für Vertrauen in heutigen und zukünftigen IT-Systemen |
| Hinterlegungsdatum: | 21 Mär 2023 08:44 |
| Letzte Änderung: | 17 Jul 2023 09:47 |
| PPN: | 509747027 |
| Zugehörige Links: | |
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