Janson, Christian ; Struck, Patrick (2022)
Sponge-based Authenticated Encryption: Security against Quantum Attackers.
13th International Conference on Post-Quantum Cryptography. virtual Conference (28.09.2022-30.09.2022)
doi: 10.1007/978-3-031-17234-2_12
Konferenzveröffentlichung, Bibliographie
Kurzbeschreibung (Abstract)
In this work, we study the security of sponge-based authenticated encryption schemes against quantum attackers. In particular, we analyse the sponge-based authenticated encryption scheme SLAE as put forward by Degabriele et al. (ASIACRYPT’19) due to its modularity. We show that the scheme achieves security in the post-quantum (QS1) setting in the quantum random oracle model by using the one-way to hiding lemma. Furthermore, we analyse the scheme in a fully-quantum (QS2) setting. There we provide a set of attacks showing that SLAE does not achieve ciphertext indistinguishability and hence overall does not provide the desired level of security.
| Typ des Eintrags: | Konferenzveröffentlichung |
|---|---|
| Erschienen: | 2022 |
| Autor(en): | Janson, Christian ; Struck, Patrick |
| Art des Eintrags: | Bibliographie |
| Titel: | Sponge-based Authenticated Encryption: Security against Quantum Attackers |
| Sprache: | Englisch |
| Publikationsjahr: | 27 September 2022 |
| Verlag: | Springer |
| Buchtitel: | Post-Quantum Cryptography |
| Reihe: | Lecture Notes in Computer Science |
| Band einer Reihe: | 13512 |
| Veranstaltungstitel: | 13th International Conference on Post-Quantum Cryptography |
| Veranstaltungsort: | virtual Conference |
| Veranstaltungsdatum: | 28.09.2022-30.09.2022 |
| DOI: | 10.1007/978-3-031-17234-2_12 |
| URL / URN: | https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-031-17234-2_... |
| Zugehörige Links: | |
| Kurzbeschreibung (Abstract): | In this work, we study the security of sponge-based authenticated encryption schemes against quantum attackers. In particular, we analyse the sponge-based authenticated encryption scheme SLAE as put forward by Degabriele et al. (ASIACRYPT’19) due to its modularity. We show that the scheme achieves security in the post-quantum (QS1) setting in the quantum random oracle model by using the one-way to hiding lemma. Furthermore, we analyse the scheme in a fully-quantum (QS2) setting. There we provide a set of attacks showing that SLAE does not achieve ciphertext indistinguishability and hence overall does not provide the desired level of security. |
| Freie Schlagworte: | Primitives, P1, P2 |
| Fachbereich(e)/-gebiet(e): | 20 Fachbereich Informatik 20 Fachbereich Informatik > Kryptographie und Komplexitätstheorie 20 Fachbereich Informatik > QPC - Quantum and Physical attack resistant Cryptography DFG-Sonderforschungsbereiche (inkl. Transregio) DFG-Sonderforschungsbereiche (inkl. Transregio) > Sonderforschungsbereiche DFG-Sonderforschungsbereiche (inkl. Transregio) > Sonderforschungsbereiche > SFB 1119: CROSSING – Kryptographiebasierte Sicherheitslösungen als Grundlage für Vertrauen in heutigen und zukünftigen IT-Systemen |
| Hinterlegungsdatum: | 06 Mär 2023 14:05 |
| Letzte Änderung: | 23 Jun 2023 14:25 |
| PPN: | 509039588 |
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