Kumar, Seema (2023)
Detecting Software Attacks on Embedded IoT Devices.
Technische Universität Darmstadt
doi: 10.26083/tuprints-00022933
Dissertation, Erstveröffentlichung, Verlagsversion
Kurzbeschreibung (Abstract)
Internet of Things (IoT) applications are being rapidly deployed in the context of smart homes, automotive vehicles, smart factories, and many more. In these applications, embedded devices are widely used as sensors, actuators, or edge nodes. The embedded devices operate distinctively on a task or interact with each other to collectively perform certain tasks. In general, increase in Internet-connected things has made embedded devices an attractive target for various cyber attacks, where an attacker gains access and control remote devices for malicious activities. These IoT devices could be exploited by an attacker to compromise the security of victim’s platform without requiring any physical hardware access.
In order to detect such software attacks and ensure a reliable and trustworthy IoT application, it is crucial to verify that a device is not compromised by malicious software, and also assert correct execution of the program. In the literature, solutions based on remote attestation, anomaly detection, control-flow and data-flow integrity have been proposed to detect software attacks. However, these solutions have limited applicability in terms of target deployments and attack detection, which we inspect thoroughly.
In this dissertation, we propose three solutions to detect software attacks on embedded IoT devices. In particular, we first propose SWARNA, which uses remote attestation to verify a large network of embedded devices and ensure that the application software on the device is not tampered. Verifying the integrity of a software preserves the static properties of a device. To secure the devices from various software attacks, it is imperative to also ensure that the runtime execution of a program is as expected. Therefore, we focus extensively on detecting memory corruption attacks that may occur during the program execution. Furthermore, we propose, SPADE and OPADE, secure program anomaly detection that runs on embedded IoT devices and use deep learning, and machine learning algorithms respectively to detect various runtime software attacks. We evaluate and analyse all the proposed solutions on real embedded hardware and IoT testbeds. We also perform a thorough security analysis to show how the proposed solutions can detect various software attacks.
Typ des Eintrags: | Dissertation | ||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|
Erschienen: | 2023 | ||||
Autor(en): | Kumar, Seema | ||||
Art des Eintrags: | Erstveröffentlichung | ||||
Titel: | Detecting Software Attacks on Embedded IoT Devices | ||||
Sprache: | Englisch | ||||
Referenten: | Mühlhäuser, Prof. Dr. Max ; Eugster, Prof. Dr. Patrick | ||||
Publikationsjahr: | 2023 | ||||
Ort: | Darmstadt | ||||
Kollation: | xiii, 145 Seiten | ||||
Datum der mündlichen Prüfung: | 23 Januar 2023 | ||||
DOI: | 10.26083/tuprints-00022933 | ||||
URL / URN: | https://tuprints.ulb.tu-darmstadt.de/22933 | ||||
Kurzbeschreibung (Abstract): | Internet of Things (IoT) applications are being rapidly deployed in the context of smart homes, automotive vehicles, smart factories, and many more. In these applications, embedded devices are widely used as sensors, actuators, or edge nodes. The embedded devices operate distinctively on a task or interact with each other to collectively perform certain tasks. In general, increase in Internet-connected things has made embedded devices an attractive target for various cyber attacks, where an attacker gains access and control remote devices for malicious activities. These IoT devices could be exploited by an attacker to compromise the security of victim’s platform without requiring any physical hardware access. In order to detect such software attacks and ensure a reliable and trustworthy IoT application, it is crucial to verify that a device is not compromised by malicious software, and also assert correct execution of the program. In the literature, solutions based on remote attestation, anomaly detection, control-flow and data-flow integrity have been proposed to detect software attacks. However, these solutions have limited applicability in terms of target deployments and attack detection, which we inspect thoroughly. In this dissertation, we propose three solutions to detect software attacks on embedded IoT devices. In particular, we first propose SWARNA, which uses remote attestation to verify a large network of embedded devices and ensure that the application software on the device is not tampered. Verifying the integrity of a software preserves the static properties of a device. To secure the devices from various software attacks, it is imperative to also ensure that the runtime execution of a program is as expected. Therefore, we focus extensively on detecting memory corruption attacks that may occur during the program execution. Furthermore, we propose, SPADE and OPADE, secure program anomaly detection that runs on embedded IoT devices and use deep learning, and machine learning algorithms respectively to detect various runtime software attacks. We evaluate and analyse all the proposed solutions on real embedded hardware and IoT testbeds. We also perform a thorough security analysis to show how the proposed solutions can detect various software attacks. |
||||
Alternatives oder übersetztes Abstract: |
|
||||
Status: | Verlagsversion | ||||
URN: | urn:nbn:de:tuda-tuprints-229332 | ||||
Sachgruppe der Dewey Dezimalklassifikatin (DDC): | 000 Allgemeines, Informatik, Informationswissenschaft > 004 Informatik | ||||
Fachbereich(e)/-gebiet(e): | 20 Fachbereich Informatik 20 Fachbereich Informatik > Telekooperation |
||||
Hinterlegungsdatum: | 02 Feb 2023 13:47 | ||||
Letzte Änderung: | 15 Feb 2023 13:25 | ||||
PPN: | |||||
Referenten: | Mühlhäuser, Prof. Dr. Max ; Eugster, Prof. Dr. Patrick | ||||
Datum der mündlichen Prüfung / Verteidigung / mdl. Prüfung: | 23 Januar 2023 | ||||
Export: | |||||
Suche nach Titel in: | TUfind oder in Google |
Frage zum Eintrag |
Optionen (nur für Redakteure)
Redaktionelle Details anzeigen |