Fischlin, Marc ; Günther, Felix ; Muth, Philipp (2020)
Information-Theoretic Security of Cryptographic Channels.
22nd International Conference on Information and Communications Security (ICICS 2020). virtual Conference (24.08.2021-26.08.2021)
doi: 10.1007/978-3-030-61078-4_17
Konferenzveröffentlichung, Bibliographie
Kurzbeschreibung (Abstract)
We discuss the setting of information-theoretically secure channel protocols where confidentiality of transmitted data should hold against unbounded adversaries. We argue that there are two possible scenarios: One is that the adversary is currently bounded, but stores today's communication and tries to break confidentiality later when obtaining more computational power or time. We call channel protocols protecting against such attacks future-secure. The other scenario is that the adversary already has extremely strong computational powers and may try to use that power to break current executions. We call channels withstanding such stronger attacks unconditionally-secure.
| Typ des Eintrags: | Konferenzveröffentlichung |
|---|---|
| Erschienen: | 2020 |
| Autor(en): | Fischlin, Marc ; Günther, Felix ; Muth, Philipp |
| Art des Eintrags: | Bibliographie |
| Titel: | Information-Theoretic Security of Cryptographic Channels |
| Sprache: | Englisch |
| Publikationsjahr: | 28 November 2020 |
| Verlag: | Springer Nature |
| Buchtitel: | Information and Communications Security |
| Veranstaltungstitel: | 22nd International Conference on Information and Communications Security (ICICS 2020) |
| Veranstaltungsort: | virtual Conference |
| Veranstaltungsdatum: | 24.08.2021-26.08.2021 |
| DOI: | 10.1007/978-3-030-61078-4_17 |
| Zugehörige Links: | |
| Kurzbeschreibung (Abstract): | We discuss the setting of information-theoretically secure channel protocols where confidentiality of transmitted data should hold against unbounded adversaries. We argue that there are two possible scenarios: One is that the adversary is currently bounded, but stores today's communication and tries to break confidentiality later when obtaining more computational power or time. We call channel protocols protecting against such attacks future-secure. The other scenario is that the adversary already has extremely strong computational powers and may try to use that power to break current executions. We call channels withstanding such stronger attacks unconditionally-secure. |
| Freie Schlagworte: | Solutions, S4, S6 |
| Zusätzliche Informationen: | Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, Vol. 12282) |
| Fachbereich(e)/-gebiet(e): | 20 Fachbereich Informatik 20 Fachbereich Informatik > Praktische Kryptographie und Privatheit 20 Fachbereich Informatik > Kryptographie und Komplexitätstheorie 20 Fachbereich Informatik > Security Engineering DFG-Sonderforschungsbereiche (inkl. Transregio) DFG-Sonderforschungsbereiche (inkl. Transregio) > Sonderforschungsbereiche Profilbereiche Profilbereiche > Cybersicherheit (CYSEC) DFG-Sonderforschungsbereiche (inkl. Transregio) > Sonderforschungsbereiche > SFB 1119: CROSSING – Kryptographiebasierte Sicherheitslösungen als Grundlage für Vertrauen in heutigen und zukünftigen IT-Systemen |
| Hinterlegungsdatum: | 18 Mai 2021 07:12 |
| Letzte Änderung: | 18 Mai 2021 07:12 |
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