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PrivateDrop: Practical Privacy-Preserving Authentication for Apple AirDrop

Heinrich, Alexander and Hollick, Matthias and Schneider, Thomas and Stute, Milan and Weinert, Christian (2021):
PrivateDrop: Practical Privacy-Preserving Authentication for Apple AirDrop.
30th USENIX Security Symposium, virtual Conference, 11.-13.08.2021, [Conference or Workshop Item]

Abstract

Apple's offline file-sharing service AirDrop is integrated into more than 1.5 billion end-user devices worldwide. We discovered two design flaws in the underlying protocol that allow attackers to learn the phone numbers and email addresses of both sender and receiver devices. As a remediation, we study the applicability of private set intersection (PSI) to mutual authentication, which is similar to contact discovery in mobile messengers. We propose a novel optimized PSI-based protocol called PrivateDrop that addresses the specific challenges of offline resource-constrained operation and integrates seamlessly into the current AirDrop protocol stack. Using our native PrivateDrop implementation for iOS and macOS, we experimentally demonstrate that PrivateDrop preserves AirDrop's exemplary user experience with an authentication delay well below one second. We responsibly disclosed our findings to Apple and open-sourced our PrivateDrop implementation.

Item Type: Conference or Workshop Item
Erschienen: 2021
Creators: Heinrich, Alexander and Hollick, Matthias and Schneider, Thomas and Stute, Milan and Weinert, Christian
Title: PrivateDrop: Practical Privacy-Preserving Authentication for Apple AirDrop
Language: English
Abstract:

Apple's offline file-sharing service AirDrop is integrated into more than 1.5 billion end-user devices worldwide. We discovered two design flaws in the underlying protocol that allow attackers to learn the phone numbers and email addresses of both sender and receiver devices. As a remediation, we study the applicability of private set intersection (PSI) to mutual authentication, which is similar to contact discovery in mobile messengers. We propose a novel optimized PSI-based protocol called PrivateDrop that addresses the specific challenges of offline resource-constrained operation and integrates seamlessly into the current AirDrop protocol stack. Using our native PrivateDrop implementation for iOS and macOS, we experimentally demonstrate that PrivateDrop preserves AirDrop's exemplary user experience with an authentication delay well below one second. We responsibly disclosed our findings to Apple and open-sourced our PrivateDrop implementation.

Uncontrolled Keywords: Engineering, E4, ATHENE, Privacy and Trust for Mobile Users: A.1 B.3 C.1
Divisions: 20 Department of Computer Science
20 Department of Computer Science > Cryptography and Privacy Engineering (ENCRYPTO)
20 Department of Computer Science > Sichere Mobile Netze
DFG-Collaborative Research Centres (incl. Transregio)
DFG-Collaborative Research Centres (incl. Transregio) > Collaborative Research Centres
Profile Areas
Profile Areas > Cybersecurity (CYSEC)
LOEWE
LOEWE > LOEWE-Zentren
LOEWE > LOEWE-Zentren > emergenCITY
DFG-Collaborative Research Centres (incl. Transregio) > Collaborative Research Centres > CRC 1119: CROSSING – Cryptography-Based Security Solutions: Enabling Trust in New and Next Generation Computing Environments
Event Title: 30th USENIX Security Symposium
Event Location: virtual Conference
Event Dates: 11.-13.08.2021
Date Deposited: 06 Apr 2021 08:16
Official URL: https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity21/presentat...
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