Ismail, Hatem (2018)
Analyzing and Mitigating Security Threats in P2P Systems.
Technische Universität Darmstadt
Dissertation, Erstveröffentlichung
Kurzbeschreibung (Abstract)
Peer-to-Peer (P2P) protocols increasingly underlie a growing diversity of net- worked applications (e.g., file sharing, streaming multimedia, storage, VoIP) especially as the decentralized P2P paradigm inherently fosters scalability and robustness. The growing application-oriented services also result in the evolu- tion of P2P systems spanning diverse data dissemination techniques, peer roles and topological structures. On the flip side, while decentralization and scalability are attractive, and common for all P2P systems, these design features also increase the P2P network’s exposure to a variety of security threats that can result in the degradation of services. In this thesis, we illustrate a set of important P2P attack types and subsequently develop approaches to secure P2P networks from these progressive and evolving attacks. Covering a comprehensive progression of P2P systems of increasing complexity (i.e., structured, unstructured and streaming), we evaluate the corresponding feasibility of conducting attacks and the resultant impact onto them. Subsequently, we investigate the progressive steps of detection, mitigation and sanitization potential to restore the requisite P2P functionality. Depending on the targeted P2P network model, we propose countermeasures that (a) are effective against a specific attack type and its possible variants, (b) are light-weight in execution, (c) are fully decentralized, i.e., do not depend on central entities, and (d) allow for both reactive and proactive mitigation. Our theoretical analysis and simulations demonstrate that our proposed attack detection/mitigation mechanisms can reach up to 90-100% detection accu- racy while inducing low overhead of 5-10% even when operating under severe attack scenarios.
Typ des Eintrags: | Dissertation | ||||
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Erschienen: | 2018 | ||||
Autor(en): | Ismail, Hatem | ||||
Art des Eintrags: | Erstveröffentlichung | ||||
Titel: | Analyzing and Mitigating Security Threats in P2P Systems | ||||
Sprache: | Englisch | ||||
Referenten: | Suri, Prof. Neeraj ; Khelil, Prof. Abdelmajid | ||||
Publikationsjahr: | 2018 | ||||
Ort: | Darmstadt | ||||
Datum der mündlichen Prüfung: | 13 September 2018 | ||||
URL / URN: | https://tuprints.ulb.tu-darmstadt.de/7812 | ||||
Kurzbeschreibung (Abstract): | Peer-to-Peer (P2P) protocols increasingly underlie a growing diversity of net- worked applications (e.g., file sharing, streaming multimedia, storage, VoIP) especially as the decentralized P2P paradigm inherently fosters scalability and robustness. The growing application-oriented services also result in the evolu- tion of P2P systems spanning diverse data dissemination techniques, peer roles and topological structures. On the flip side, while decentralization and scalability are attractive, and common for all P2P systems, these design features also increase the P2P network’s exposure to a variety of security threats that can result in the degradation of services. In this thesis, we illustrate a set of important P2P attack types and subsequently develop approaches to secure P2P networks from these progressive and evolving attacks. Covering a comprehensive progression of P2P systems of increasing complexity (i.e., structured, unstructured and streaming), we evaluate the corresponding feasibility of conducting attacks and the resultant impact onto them. Subsequently, we investigate the progressive steps of detection, mitigation and sanitization potential to restore the requisite P2P functionality. Depending on the targeted P2P network model, we propose countermeasures that (a) are effective against a specific attack type and its possible variants, (b) are light-weight in execution, (c) are fully decentralized, i.e., do not depend on central entities, and (d) allow for both reactive and proactive mitigation. Our theoretical analysis and simulations demonstrate that our proposed attack detection/mitigation mechanisms can reach up to 90-100% detection accu- racy while inducing low overhead of 5-10% even when operating under severe attack scenarios. |
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URN: | urn:nbn:de:tuda-tuprints-78124 | ||||
Sachgruppe der Dewey Dezimalklassifikatin (DDC): | 000 Allgemeines, Informatik, Informationswissenschaft > 004 Informatik | ||||
Fachbereich(e)/-gebiet(e): | 20 Fachbereich Informatik 20 Fachbereich Informatik > Zuverlässige Eingebettete Softwaresysteme |
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Hinterlegungsdatum: | 07 Okt 2018 19:55 | ||||
Letzte Änderung: | 07 Okt 2018 19:55 | ||||
PPN: | |||||
Referenten: | Suri, Prof. Neeraj ; Khelil, Prof. Abdelmajid | ||||
Datum der mündlichen Prüfung / Verteidigung / mdl. Prüfung: | 13 September 2018 | ||||
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