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Quantum security analysis of a lattice-based oblivious transfer protocol

Liu, Mo-meng ; Krämer, Juliane ; Hu, Yu-pu ; Buchmann, Johannes :
Quantum security analysis of a lattice-based oblivious transfer protocol.
[Online-Edition: https://link.springer.com/journal/11714]
In: Frontiers of Information Technology & Electronic Engineering, 18, Issue 9 S. 1348-1369. ISSN 2095-9184 (Print) 2095-9230 (Online)
[Artikel] , (2018)

Offizielle URL: https://link.springer.com/journal/11714

Kurzbeschreibung (Abstract)

Because of the concise functionality of oblivious transfer (OT) protocols, they have been widely used as building blocks in secure multiparty computation and high-level protocols. The security of OT protocols built upon classical number theoretic problems, such as the discrete logarithm and factoring, however, is threatened as a result of the huge progress in quantum computing. Therefore, post-quantum cryptography is needed for protocols based on classical problems, and several proposals for post-quantum OT protocols exist. However, most post-quantum cryptosystems present their security proof only in the context of classical adversaries, not in the quantum setting. In this paper, we close this gap and prove the security of the lattice-based OT protocol proposed by Peikert et al. (CRYPTO, 2008), which is universally composably secure under the assumption of learning with errors hardness, in the quantum setting. We apply three general quantum security analysis frameworks. First, we apply the quantum lifting theorem proposed by Unruh (EUROCRYPT, 2010) to prove that the security of the lattice-based OT protocol can be lifted into the quantum world. Then, we apply two more security analysis frameworks specified for post-quantum cryptographic primitives, i.e., simple hybrid arguments (CRYPTO, 2011) and game-preserving reduction (PQCrypto, 2014).

Typ des Eintrags: Artikel
Erschienen: 2018
Autor(en): Liu, Mo-meng ; Krämer, Juliane ; Hu, Yu-pu ; Buchmann, Johannes
Titel: Quantum security analysis of a lattice-based oblivious transfer protocol
Sprache: Englisch
Kurzbeschreibung (Abstract):

Because of the concise functionality of oblivious transfer (OT) protocols, they have been widely used as building blocks in secure multiparty computation and high-level protocols. The security of OT protocols built upon classical number theoretic problems, such as the discrete logarithm and factoring, however, is threatened as a result of the huge progress in quantum computing. Therefore, post-quantum cryptography is needed for protocols based on classical problems, and several proposals for post-quantum OT protocols exist. However, most post-quantum cryptosystems present their security proof only in the context of classical adversaries, not in the quantum setting. In this paper, we close this gap and prove the security of the lattice-based OT protocol proposed by Peikert et al. (CRYPTO, 2008), which is universally composably secure under the assumption of learning with errors hardness, in the quantum setting. We apply three general quantum security analysis frameworks. First, we apply the quantum lifting theorem proposed by Unruh (EUROCRYPT, 2010) to prove that the security of the lattice-based OT protocol can be lifted into the quantum world. Then, we apply two more security analysis frameworks specified for post-quantum cryptographic primitives, i.e., simple hybrid arguments (CRYPTO, 2011) and game-preserving reduction (PQCrypto, 2014).

Titel der Zeitschrift, Zeitung oder Schriftenreihe: Frontiers of Information Technology & Electronic Engineering
Buchtitel: https://link.springer.com/journal/11714
Reihe: LNCS
Band: 18, Issue 9
Verlag: Springer
Freie Schlagworte: Primitives; P1; Oblivious transfer; Post-quantum; Lattice-based; Learning with errors; Universally composable
Fachbereich(e)/-gebiet(e): 20 Fachbereich Informatik
20 Fachbereich Informatik > Theoretische Informatik - Kryptographie und Computeralgebra
DFG-Sonderforschungsbereiche (inkl. Transregio)
DFG-Sonderforschungsbereiche (inkl. Transregio) > Sonderforschungsbereiche
Profilbereiche
Profilbereiche > Cybersicherheit (CYSEC)
DFG-Sonderforschungsbereiche (inkl. Transregio) > Sonderforschungsbereiche > SFB 1119: CROSSING – Kryptographiebasierte Sicherheitslösungen als Grundlage für Vertrauen in heutigen und zukünftigen IT-Systemen
Hinterlegungsdatum: 06 Sep 2018 11:40
Offizielle URL: https://link.springer.com/journal/11714
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