Fraunhoffer, R. ; Kim, H. Y. ; Schiereck, D. (2018)
Value Creation in M&A Transactions, Conference Calls, and Shareholder Protection.
In: International Journal of Financial Studies, 6 (1)
doi: 10.3390/ijfs6010005
Artikel, Bibliographie
Dies ist die neueste Version dieses Eintrags.
Kurzbeschreibung (Abstract)
This study investigates whether conference calls accompanying M&A announcements in Europe provide valuable information for capital market participants and hence induce an abnormal stock price revaluation on the bidder’s equity. Based on handpicked data for transactions between 2008 and 2012 we focus on the five most acquisitive country markets in Europe. Overall, our results show that bidders are more likely to conduct conference calls with increasing transaction value, for transactions with public targets and non-diversifying transactions. Further, the decision for voluntary disclosure is positively influenced by increased bidder size and the comparably weaker governance systems for German and Swiss firms. After controlling for self-selection bias and other determinants of stock returns around mergers and acquisitions (M&A) announcement, evidence is in strong support that firms with merger-related conference calls yield a higher abnormal return than firms merely publishing a press release. However, significant favourable investor reaction is only present in the UK and French subsamples and in the subsamples of industries with a focus on research and development (R&D).
Typ des Eintrags: | Artikel |
---|---|
Erschienen: | 2018 |
Autor(en): | Fraunhoffer, R. ; Kim, H. Y. ; Schiereck, D. |
Art des Eintrags: | Bibliographie |
Titel: | Value Creation in M&A Transactions, Conference Calls, and Shareholder Protection |
Sprache: | Englisch |
Publikationsjahr: | 2018 |
Ort: | Basel |
Verlag: | MDPI |
Titel der Zeitschrift, Zeitung oder Schriftenreihe: | International Journal of Financial Studies |
Jahrgang/Volume einer Zeitschrift: | 6 |
(Heft-)Nummer: | 1 |
DOI: | 10.3390/ijfs6010005 |
Zugehörige Links: | |
Kurzbeschreibung (Abstract): | This study investigates whether conference calls accompanying M&A announcements in Europe provide valuable information for capital market participants and hence induce an abnormal stock price revaluation on the bidder’s equity. Based on handpicked data for transactions between 2008 and 2012 we focus on the five most acquisitive country markets in Europe. Overall, our results show that bidders are more likely to conduct conference calls with increasing transaction value, for transactions with public targets and non-diversifying transactions. Further, the decision for voluntary disclosure is positively influenced by increased bidder size and the comparably weaker governance systems for German and Swiss firms. After controlling for self-selection bias and other determinants of stock returns around mergers and acquisitions (M&A) announcement, evidence is in strong support that firms with merger-related conference calls yield a higher abnormal return than firms merely publishing a press release. However, significant favourable investor reaction is only present in the UK and French subsamples and in the subsamples of industries with a focus on research and development (R&D). |
Freie Schlagworte: | mergers & acquisitions, conference calls, voluntary disclosure, shareholder protection |
Fachbereich(e)/-gebiet(e): | 01 Fachbereich Rechts- und Wirtschaftswissenschaften 01 Fachbereich Rechts- und Wirtschaftswissenschaften > Betriebswirtschaftliche Fachgebiete 01 Fachbereich Rechts- und Wirtschaftswissenschaften > Betriebswirtschaftliche Fachgebiete > Fachgebiet Unternehmensfinanzierung |
Hinterlegungsdatum: | 05 Jun 2018 15:15 |
Letzte Änderung: | 19 Jul 2024 09:54 |
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Value Creation in M&A Transactions, Conference Calls, and Shareholder Protection. (deposited 21 Nov 2023 13:47)
- Value Creation in M&A Transactions, Conference Calls, and Shareholder Protection. (deposited 05 Jun 2018 15:15) [Gegenwärtig angezeigt]
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