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Side channels attacks in code-based cryptography

Cayrel, Pierre-Louis and Strenzke, Falko (2010):
Side channels attacks in code-based cryptography.
In: First International Workshop on Constructive Side-Channel Analysis and Secure Design (COSADE 2010), [Conference or Workshop Item]

Abstract

The McEliece and the Niederreiter public key cryptosystems (PKC) are supposed secure in a post quantum world because there is no efficient quantum algorithm for the underlying problems upon which these cryptosystems are built. The CFS, Stern and KKS signature schemes are post-quantum secure because they are based on hard problems of coding theory. The purpose of this article is to describe what kind of attacks have been proposed against code-based constructions and what is missing.

Item Type: Conference or Workshop Item
Erschienen: 2010
Creators: Cayrel, Pierre-Louis and Strenzke, Falko
Title: Side channels attacks in code-based cryptography
Language: German
Abstract:

The McEliece and the Niederreiter public key cryptosystems (PKC) are supposed secure in a post quantum world because there is no efficient quantum algorithm for the underlying problems upon which these cryptosystems are built. The CFS, Stern and KKS signature schemes are post-quantum secure because they are based on hard problems of coding theory. The purpose of this article is to describe what kind of attacks have been proposed against code-based constructions and what is missing.

Journal or Publication Title: International Workshop on Constructive Side-Channel Analysis and Secure Design COSADE 2010
Title of Book: First International Workshop on Constructive Side-Channel Analysis and Secure Design (COSADE 2010)
Uncontrolled Keywords: Secure Data
Divisions: LOEWE > LOEWE-Zentren > CASED – Center for Advanced Security Research Darmstadt
LOEWE > LOEWE-Zentren
LOEWE
Date Deposited: 30 Dec 2016 20:23
Identification Number: TUD-CS-2010-0133
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