Cayrel, Pierre-Louis ; Lindner, Richard ; Rückert, Markus ; Silva, Rosemberg (2010)
Improved Zero-knowledge Identification with Lattices.
Malacca, Malaysia (13.10.2010-15.10.2010)
Konferenzveröffentlichung, Bibliographie
Kurzbeschreibung (Abstract)
Zero-knowledge identification schemes solve the problem of authenticating one party to another via an insecure channel without disclosing any more information. In this paper we propose such a scheme employing a commitment scheme and using the hardness of worst-case lattice problems as basis of security. We adapt a code-based identification scheme devised by Cayrel and Véron which is an improvement of Stern's scheme. Our scheme sports analogous improvements over a lattice adaption of Stern's scheme which Kawachi et al. presented at ASIACRYPT 2008. Specifically, due to a smaller cheating probability of 1/2 and a similar communication cost, any desired level of security will be achieved in fewer rounds. Compared to Lyubashevsky's scheme presented at ASIACRYPT 2009, our proposal, like Kawachi's, oers a much milder security assumption, namely the hardness of SIS for trinary solutions. The same assumption was used for the SWIFFT hash function, which is secure for much smaller parameters than those proposed by Lyubashevsky.
| Typ des Eintrags: | Konferenzveröffentlichung |
|---|---|
| Erschienen: | 2010 |
| Autor(en): | Cayrel, Pierre-Louis ; Lindner, Richard ; Rückert, Markus ; Silva, Rosemberg |
| Art des Eintrags: | Bibliographie |
| Titel: | Improved Zero-knowledge Identification with Lattices |
| Sprache: | Englisch |
| Publikationsjahr: | November 2010 |
| Ort: | Berlin |
| Verlag: | Springer |
| (Heft-)Nummer: | 6402 |
| Buchtitel: | The Fourth International Conference on Provable Security (ProvSec 2010) |
| Reihe: | Lecture notes in computer science |
| Band einer Reihe: | 6402 |
| Veranstaltungsort: | Malacca, Malaysia |
| Veranstaltungsdatum: | 13.10.2010-15.10.2010 |
| Zugehörige Links: | |
| Kurzbeschreibung (Abstract): | Zero-knowledge identification schemes solve the problem of authenticating one party to another via an insecure channel without disclosing any more information. In this paper we propose such a scheme employing a commitment scheme and using the hardness of worst-case lattice problems as basis of security. We adapt a code-based identification scheme devised by Cayrel and Véron which is an improvement of Stern's scheme. Our scheme sports analogous improvements over a lattice adaption of Stern's scheme which Kawachi et al. presented at ASIACRYPT 2008. Specifically, due to a smaller cheating probability of 1/2 and a similar communication cost, any desired level of security will be achieved in fewer rounds. Compared to Lyubashevsky's scheme presented at ASIACRYPT 2009, our proposal, like Kawachi's, oers a much milder security assumption, namely the hardness of SIS for trinary solutions. The same assumption was used for the SWIFFT hash function, which is secure for much smaller parameters than those proposed by Lyubashevsky. |
| Freie Schlagworte: | Secure Data |
| ID-Nummer: | TUD-CS-2010-0140 |
| Fachbereich(e)/-gebiet(e): | 20 Fachbereich Informatik 20 Fachbereich Informatik > Theoretische Informatik - Kryptographie und Computeralgebra LOEWE LOEWE > LOEWE-Zentren LOEWE > LOEWE-Zentren > CASED – Center for Advanced Security Research Darmstadt |
| Hinterlegungsdatum: | 30 Dez 2016 20:23 |
| Letzte Änderung: | 24 Feb 2022 07:58 |
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