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Practical and Lightweight Domain Isolation on Android

Bugiel, Sven ; Davi, Lucas ; Dmitrienko, Alexandra ; Heuser, Stephan ; Sadeghi, Ahmad-Reza ; Shastry, Bhargava (2011)
Practical and Lightweight Domain Isolation on Android.
Konferenzveröffentlichung, Bibliographie

Kurzbeschreibung (Abstract)

In this paper, we introduce a security framework for practical and lightweight domain isolation on Android to mitigate unauthorized data access and communication among applications of different trust levels (e.g., private and corporate). We present the design and implementation of our framework, TrustDroid, which in contrast to existing solutions enables isolation at different layers of the Android software stack: (1) at the middleware layer to prevent inter-domain application communication and data access, (2) at the kernel layer to enforce mandatory access control on the file system and on Inter-Process Communication (IPC) channels, and (3) at the network layer to mediate network traffic. For instance, (3) allows network data to be only read by a particular domain, or enables basic context-based policies such as preventing Internet access by untrusted applications while an employee is connected to the company's network.

Our approach accurately addresses the demands of the business world, namely to isolate data and applications of different trust levels in a practical and lightweight way. Moreover, our solution is the first leveraging mandatory access control with TOMOYO Linux on a real Android device (Nexus One). Our evaluation demonstrates that TrustDroid only adds a negligible overhead, and in contrast to contemporary full virtualization, only minimally affects the battery's life-time.

Typ des Eintrags: Konferenzveröffentlichung
Erschienen: 2011
Autor(en): Bugiel, Sven ; Davi, Lucas ; Dmitrienko, Alexandra ; Heuser, Stephan ; Sadeghi, Ahmad-Reza ; Shastry, Bhargava
Art des Eintrags: Bibliographie
Titel: Practical and Lightweight Domain Isolation on Android
Sprache: Deutsch
Publikationsjahr: Oktober 2011
Verlag: ACM Press
Buchtitel: Proceedings of the 1st ACM CCS Workshop on Security and Privacy in Mobile Devices (SPSM)
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Kurzbeschreibung (Abstract):

In this paper, we introduce a security framework for practical and lightweight domain isolation on Android to mitigate unauthorized data access and communication among applications of different trust levels (e.g., private and corporate). We present the design and implementation of our framework, TrustDroid, which in contrast to existing solutions enables isolation at different layers of the Android software stack: (1) at the middleware layer to prevent inter-domain application communication and data access, (2) at the kernel layer to enforce mandatory access control on the file system and on Inter-Process Communication (IPC) channels, and (3) at the network layer to mediate network traffic. For instance, (3) allows network data to be only read by a particular domain, or enables basic context-based policies such as preventing Internet access by untrusted applications while an employee is connected to the company's network.

Our approach accurately addresses the demands of the business world, namely to isolate data and applications of different trust levels in a practical and lightweight way. Moreover, our solution is the first leveraging mandatory access control with TOMOYO Linux on a real Android device (Nexus One). Our evaluation demonstrates that TrustDroid only adds a negligible overhead, and in contrast to contemporary full virtualization, only minimally affects the battery's life-time.

Freie Schlagworte: Security
ID-Nummer: TUD-CS-2011-0218
Fachbereich(e)/-gebiet(e): 20 Fachbereich Informatik
20 Fachbereich Informatik > Systemsicherheit
LOEWE
LOEWE > LOEWE-Zentren
LOEWE > LOEWE-Zentren > CASED – Center for Advanced Security Research Darmstadt
Hinterlegungsdatum: 04 Aug 2016 10:13
Letzte Änderung: 03 Jun 2018 21:31
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