Sadeghi, Ahmad-Reza ; Schulz, Steffen ; Varadharajan, Vijay (2012)
The Silence of the LANs: Efficient Leakage Resilience for IPsec VPNs (full version).
Report, Bibliographie
Kurzbeschreibung (Abstract)
Virtual Private Networks (VPNs) are increasingly used to build logically isolated networks. However, existing VPN designs and deployments neglect the problem of traffic analysis and covert channels. Hence, there are many ways to infer information from VPN traffic with- out decrypting it. Many proposals were made to mitigate network covert channels, but previous works remained largely theoretical or resulted in prohibitively high padding overhead and performance penalties. In this work, we (1) analyse the impact of covert channels in IPsec, (2) present several improved and novel approaches for covert channel mit- igation in IPsec, (3) propose and implement a system for dynamic perfor- mance trade-offs, and (4) implement our design in the Linux IPsec stack and evaluate its performance for different types of traffic and mitigation policies. At only 24% overhead, our prototype enforces tight information- theoretic bounds on all information leakage.
| Typ des Eintrags: | Report |
|---|---|
| Erschienen: | 2012 |
| Autor(en): | Sadeghi, Ahmad-Reza ; Schulz, Steffen ; Varadharajan, Vijay |
| Art des Eintrags: | Bibliographie |
| Titel: | The Silence of the LANs: Efficient Leakage Resilience for IPsec VPNs (full version) |
| Sprache: | Deutsch |
| Publikationsjahr: | August 2012 |
| Zugehörige Links: | |
| Kurzbeschreibung (Abstract): | Virtual Private Networks (VPNs) are increasingly used to build logically isolated networks. However, existing VPN designs and deployments neglect the problem of traffic analysis and covert channels. Hence, there are many ways to infer information from VPN traffic with- out decrypting it. Many proposals were made to mitigate network covert channels, but previous works remained largely theoretical or resulted in prohibitively high padding overhead and performance penalties. In this work, we (1) analyse the impact of covert channels in IPsec, (2) present several improved and novel approaches for covert channel mit- igation in IPsec, (3) propose and implement a system for dynamic perfor- mance trade-offs, and (4) implement our design in the Linux IPsec stack and evaluate its performance for different types of traffic and mitigation policies. At only 24% overhead, our prototype enforces tight information- theoretic bounds on all information leakage. |
| Freie Schlagworte: | Secure Things;Secure Models |
| ID-Nummer: | TUD-CS-2012-0165 |
| Fachbereich(e)/-gebiet(e): | 20 Fachbereich Informatik 20 Fachbereich Informatik > Systemsicherheit Profilbereiche Profilbereiche > Cybersicherheit (CYSEC) LOEWE LOEWE > LOEWE-Zentren LOEWE > LOEWE-Zentren > CASED – Center for Advanced Security Research Darmstadt 20 Fachbereich Informatik > EC SPRIDE |
| Hinterlegungsdatum: | 04 Aug 2016 10:13 |
| Letzte Änderung: | 03 Jun 2018 21:31 |
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