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Gadge Me If You Can - Secure and Efficient Ad-hoc Instruction-Level Randomization for x86 and ARM

Davi, Lucas ; Dmitrienko, Alexandra ; Nürnberger, Stefan ; Sadeghi, Ahmad-Reza (2013)
Gadge Me If You Can - Secure and Efficient Ad-hoc Instruction-Level Randomization for x86 and ARM.
Konferenzveröffentlichung, Bibliographie

Kurzbeschreibung (Abstract)

Code reuse attacks such as return-oriented programming are one of the most powerful threats to contemporary software. ASLR was introduced to impede these attacks by dispersing shared libraries and the executable in memory. However, in practice its entropy is rather low and, more importantly, the leakage of a single address reveals the position of a whole library in memory. The recent mitigation literature followed the route of randomization, applied it at different stages such as source code or the executable binary. However, the code segments still stay in one block. In contrast to previous work, our randomization solution, called XIFER, (1) disperses all code (executable and libraries) across the whole address space, (2) re-randomizes the address space for each run, (3) is compatible to code signing, and (4) does neither require offline static analysis nor source-code. Our prototype implementation supports the Linux ELF file format and covers both mainstream processor architectures x86 and ARM. Our evaluation demonstrates that XIFER performs efficiently at load- and during run-time (1.2% overhead).

Typ des Eintrags: Konferenzveröffentlichung
Erschienen: 2013
Autor(en): Davi, Lucas ; Dmitrienko, Alexandra ; Nürnberger, Stefan ; Sadeghi, Ahmad-Reza
Art des Eintrags: Bibliographie
Titel: Gadge Me If You Can - Secure and Efficient Ad-hoc Instruction-Level Randomization for x86 and ARM
Sprache: Deutsch
Publikationsjahr: Mai 2013
Buchtitel: 8th ACM Symposium on Information, Computer and Communications Security (ASIACCS 2013)
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Kurzbeschreibung (Abstract):

Code reuse attacks such as return-oriented programming are one of the most powerful threats to contemporary software. ASLR was introduced to impede these attacks by dispersing shared libraries and the executable in memory. However, in practice its entropy is rather low and, more importantly, the leakage of a single address reveals the position of a whole library in memory. The recent mitigation literature followed the route of randomization, applied it at different stages such as source code or the executable binary. However, the code segments still stay in one block. In contrast to previous work, our randomization solution, called XIFER, (1) disperses all code (executable and libraries) across the whole address space, (2) re-randomizes the address space for each run, (3) is compatible to code signing, and (4) does neither require offline static analysis nor source-code. Our prototype implementation supports the Linux ELF file format and covers both mainstream processor architectures x86 and ARM. Our evaluation demonstrates that XIFER performs efficiently at load- and during run-time (1.2% overhead).

Freie Schlagworte: ICRI-SC;Secure Things
ID-Nummer: TUD-CS-2013-0042
Fachbereich(e)/-gebiet(e): 20 Fachbereich Informatik
20 Fachbereich Informatik > Systemsicherheit
Profilbereiche
Profilbereiche > Cybersicherheit (CYSEC)
LOEWE
LOEWE > LOEWE-Zentren
LOEWE > LOEWE-Zentren > CASED – Center for Advanced Security Research Darmstadt
Hinterlegungsdatum: 04 Aug 2016 10:13
Letzte Änderung: 03 Jun 2018 21:31
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