TU Darmstadt / ULB / TUbiblio

Gadge Me If You Can - Secure and Efficient Ad-hoc Instruction-Level Randomization for x86 and ARM

Davi, Lucas and Dmitrienko, Alexandra and Nürnberger, Stefan and Sadeghi, Ahmad-Reza :
Gadge Me If You Can - Secure and Efficient Ad-hoc Instruction-Level Randomization for x86 and ARM.
8th ACM Symposium on Information, Computer and Communications Security (ASIACCS 2013)
[Conference or Workshop Item] , (2013)

Abstract

Code reuse attacks such as return-oriented programming are one of the most powerful threats to contemporary software. ASLR was introduced to impede these attacks by dispersing shared libraries and the executable in memory. However, in practice its entropy is rather low and, more importantly, the leakage of a single address reveals the position of a whole library in memory. The recent mitigation literature followed the route of randomization, applied it at different stages such as source code or the executable binary. However, the code segments still stay in one block. In contrast to previous work, our randomization solution, called XIFER, (1) disperses all code (executable and libraries) across the whole address space, (2) re-randomizes the address space for each run, (3) is compatible to code signing, and (4) does neither require offline static analysis nor source-code. Our prototype implementation supports the Linux ELF file format and covers both mainstream processor architectures x86 and ARM. Our evaluation demonstrates that XIFER performs efficiently at load- and during run-time (1.2% overhead).

Item Type: Conference or Workshop Item
Erschienen: 2013
Creators: Davi, Lucas and Dmitrienko, Alexandra and Nürnberger, Stefan and Sadeghi, Ahmad-Reza
Title: Gadge Me If You Can - Secure and Efficient Ad-hoc Instruction-Level Randomization for x86 and ARM
Language: German
Abstract:

Code reuse attacks such as return-oriented programming are one of the most powerful threats to contemporary software. ASLR was introduced to impede these attacks by dispersing shared libraries and the executable in memory. However, in practice its entropy is rather low and, more importantly, the leakage of a single address reveals the position of a whole library in memory. The recent mitigation literature followed the route of randomization, applied it at different stages such as source code or the executable binary. However, the code segments still stay in one block. In contrast to previous work, our randomization solution, called XIFER, (1) disperses all code (executable and libraries) across the whole address space, (2) re-randomizes the address space for each run, (3) is compatible to code signing, and (4) does neither require offline static analysis nor source-code. Our prototype implementation supports the Linux ELF file format and covers both mainstream processor architectures x86 and ARM. Our evaluation demonstrates that XIFER performs efficiently at load- and during run-time (1.2% overhead).

Title of Book: 8th ACM Symposium on Information, Computer and Communications Security (ASIACCS 2013)
Uncontrolled Keywords: ICRI-SC;Secure Things
Divisions: Department of Computer Science
Department of Computer Science > System Security Lab
Profile Areas
Profile Areas > Cybersecurity (CYSEC)
LOEWE
LOEWE > LOEWE-Zentren
LOEWE > LOEWE-Zentren > CASED – Center for Advanced Security Research Darmstadt
Date Deposited: 04 Aug 2016 10:13
Identification Number: TUD-CS-2013-0042
Related URLs:
Export:

Optionen (nur für Redakteure)

View Item View Item