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Just-In-Time Code Reuse: On the Effectiveness of Fine-Grained Address Space Layout Randomization (Best Student Paper Award)

Snow, Kevin ; Davi, Lucas ; Dmitrienko, Alexandra ; Liebchen, Christopher ; Monrose, Fabian ; Sadeghi, Ahmad-Reza :
Just-In-Time Code Reuse: On the Effectiveness of Fine-Grained Address Space Layout Randomization (Best Student Paper Award).
34th IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (Oakland 2013)
[Konferenz- oder Workshop-Beitrag], (2013)

Kurzbeschreibung (Abstract)

Fine-grained address space layout randomization (ASLR) has recently been proposed as a method of efficiently mitigating runtime attacks. In this paper, we introduce the design and implementation of a framework based on a novel attack strategy, dubbed just-in-time code reuse, that undermines the benefits of fine-grained ASLR. Specifically, we derail the assumptions embodied in fine-grained ASLR by exploiting the ability to repeatedly abuse a memory disclosure to map an application's memory layout on-the-fly, dynamically discover API functions and gadgets, and JIT-compile a target program using those gadgets - all within a script environment at the time an exploit is launched. We demonstrate the power of our framework by using it in conjunction with a real-world exploit against Internet Explorer, and also provide extensive evaluations that demonstrate the practicality of just-in-time code reuse attacks. Our findings suggest that fine-grained ASLR may not be as promising as first thought.

Typ des Eintrags: Konferenz- oder Workshop-Beitrag (Keine Angabe)
Erschienen: 2013
Autor(en): Snow, Kevin ; Davi, Lucas ; Dmitrienko, Alexandra ; Liebchen, Christopher ; Monrose, Fabian ; Sadeghi, Ahmad-Reza
Titel: Just-In-Time Code Reuse: On the Effectiveness of Fine-Grained Address Space Layout Randomization (Best Student Paper Award)
Sprache: Deutsch
Kurzbeschreibung (Abstract):

Fine-grained address space layout randomization (ASLR) has recently been proposed as a method of efficiently mitigating runtime attacks. In this paper, we introduce the design and implementation of a framework based on a novel attack strategy, dubbed just-in-time code reuse, that undermines the benefits of fine-grained ASLR. Specifically, we derail the assumptions embodied in fine-grained ASLR by exploiting the ability to repeatedly abuse a memory disclosure to map an application's memory layout on-the-fly, dynamically discover API functions and gadgets, and JIT-compile a target program using those gadgets - all within a script environment at the time an exploit is launched. We demonstrate the power of our framework by using it in conjunction with a real-world exploit against Internet Explorer, and also provide extensive evaluations that demonstrate the practicality of just-in-time code reuse attacks. Our findings suggest that fine-grained ASLR may not be as promising as first thought.

Buchtitel: 34th IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (Oakland 2013)
Freie Schlagworte: ICRI-SC;Secure Things
Fachbereich(e)/-gebiet(e): 20 Fachbereich Informatik
20 Fachbereich Informatik > Systemsicherheit
Profilbereiche
Profilbereiche > Cybersicherheit (CYSEC)
LOEWE
LOEWE > LOEWE-Zentren
LOEWE > LOEWE-Zentren > CASED – Center for Advanced Security Research Darmstadt
Hinterlegungsdatum: 04 Aug 2016 10:13
ID-Nummer: TUD-CS-2013-0026
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