Heuser, Stephan ; Negro, Marco ; Pendyala, Praveen Kumar ; Sadeghi, Ahmad-Reza (2016)
DroidAuditor: Forensic Analysis of Application-Layer Privilege Escalation Attacks on Android.
Report, Bibliographie
Kurzbeschreibung (Abstract)
Smart mobile devices process and store a vast amount of security- and privacy sensitive data. To protect this data from mali- cious applications mobile operating systems, such as Android, adopt fine- grained access control architectures. However, related work has shown that these access control architectures are susceptible to application- layer privilege escalation attacks. Both automated static and dynamic program analysis promise to proactively detect such attacks. Though while state-of-the-art static analysis frameworks cannot adequately ad- dress native and highly obfuscated code, dynamic analysis is vulnerable to malicious applications using logic bombs to avoid early detection. In contrast, the long-term observation of application behavior could help users and security analysts better understand malicious apps. In this pa- per we present the design and implementation of DroidAuditor, which observes application behavior on real Android devices and generates a graph-based representation. It visualizes this behavior graph, which en- ables users to develop an intuitive understanding of application inter- nals. Our solution further allows security analysts to query the behavior graph for malicious patterns. We present the design of the DroidAudi- tor framework and instantiate it using the Android Security Modules (ASM) access control architecture. We evaluate its capability to detect application-layer privilege escalation attacks, such as confused deputy and collusion attacks. In addition, we demonstrate how our architecture can be used to analyze malicious spyware applications.
Typ des Eintrags: | Report |
---|---|
Erschienen: | 2016 |
Autor(en): | Heuser, Stephan ; Negro, Marco ; Pendyala, Praveen Kumar ; Sadeghi, Ahmad-Reza |
Art des Eintrags: | Bibliographie |
Titel: | DroidAuditor: Forensic Analysis of Application-Layer Privilege Escalation Attacks on Android |
Sprache: | Englisch |
Publikationsjahr: | 28 Januar 2016 |
Ort: | Darmstadt |
Verlag: | Technische Universität |
Reihe: | Technical Report |
Zugehörige Links: | |
Kurzbeschreibung (Abstract): | Smart mobile devices process and store a vast amount of security- and privacy sensitive data. To protect this data from mali- cious applications mobile operating systems, such as Android, adopt fine- grained access control architectures. However, related work has shown that these access control architectures are susceptible to application- layer privilege escalation attacks. Both automated static and dynamic program analysis promise to proactively detect such attacks. Though while state-of-the-art static analysis frameworks cannot adequately ad- dress native and highly obfuscated code, dynamic analysis is vulnerable to malicious applications using logic bombs to avoid early detection. In contrast, the long-term observation of application behavior could help users and security analysts better understand malicious apps. In this pa- per we present the design and implementation of DroidAuditor, which observes application behavior on real Android devices and generates a graph-based representation. It visualizes this behavior graph, which en- ables users to develop an intuitive understanding of application inter- nals. Our solution further allows security analysts to query the behavior graph for malicious patterns. We present the design of the DroidAudi- tor framework and instantiate it using the Android Security Modules (ASM) access control architecture. We evaluate its capability to detect application-layer privilege escalation attacks, such as confused deputy and collusion attacks. In addition, we demonstrate how our architecture can be used to analyze malicious spyware applications. |
Freie Schlagworte: | ICRI-SC, Secure Things |
Fachbereich(e)/-gebiet(e): | 20 Fachbereich Informatik 20 Fachbereich Informatik > Systemsicherheit Profilbereiche Profilbereiche > Cybersicherheit (CYSEC) LOEWE LOEWE > LOEWE-Zentren LOEWE > LOEWE-Zentren > CASED – Center for Advanced Security Research Darmstadt |
Hinterlegungsdatum: | 04 Aug 2016 10:13 |
Letzte Änderung: | 15 Aug 2023 13:04 |
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