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ZeTA - Zero-Trust Authentication: Relying on Innate Human Ability, not Technology

Gutmann, Andreas ; Renaud, Karen ; Maguire, Joseph ; Mayer, Peter ; Volkamer, Melanie ; Matsuura, Kanta ; Müller-Quade, Jörn (2016)
ZeTA - Zero-Trust Authentication: Relying on Innate Human Ability, not Technology.
Saarbrucken
doi: 10.1109/EuroSP.2016.35
Konferenzveröffentlichung, Bibliographie

Kurzbeschreibung (Abstract)

Reliable authentication requires the devices and channels involved in the process to be trustworthy; otherwise authentication secrets can easily be compromised. Given the unceasing efforts of attackers worldwide such trustworthiness is increasingly not a given. A variety of technical solutions, such as utilising multiple devices/channels and verification protocols, has the potential to mitigate the threat of untrusted communications to a certain extent. Yet such technical solutions make two assumptions: (1) users have access to multiple devices and (2) attackers will not resort to hacking the human, using social engineering techniques.

In this paper, we propose and explore the potential of using human-based computation instead of solely technical solutions to mitigate the threat of untrusted devices and channels. ZeTA (Zero Trust Authentication on untrusted channels) has the potential to allow people to authenticate despite compromised channels or communications and easily observed usage.

Our contributions are threefold: (1) We propose the ZeTA protocol with a formal definition and security analysis that utilises semantics and human-based computation to ameliorate the problem of untrusted devices and channels. (2) We outline a security analysis to assess the envisaged performance of the proposed authentication protocol. (3) We report on a usability study that explores the viability of relying on human computation in this context.

Typ des Eintrags: Konferenzveröffentlichung
Erschienen: 2016
Autor(en): Gutmann, Andreas ; Renaud, Karen ; Maguire, Joseph ; Mayer, Peter ; Volkamer, Melanie ; Matsuura, Kanta ; Müller-Quade, Jörn
Art des Eintrags: Bibliographie
Titel: ZeTA - Zero-Trust Authentication: Relying on Innate Human Ability, not Technology
Sprache: Englisch
Publikationsjahr: März 2016
Verlag: IEEE
Buchtitel: 2016 IEEE European Symposium on Security and Privacy (EuroS&P)
Veranstaltungsort: Saarbrucken
DOI: 10.1109/EuroSP.2016.35
Zugehörige Links:
Kurzbeschreibung (Abstract):

Reliable authentication requires the devices and channels involved in the process to be trustworthy; otherwise authentication secrets can easily be compromised. Given the unceasing efforts of attackers worldwide such trustworthiness is increasingly not a given. A variety of technical solutions, such as utilising multiple devices/channels and verification protocols, has the potential to mitigate the threat of untrusted communications to a certain extent. Yet such technical solutions make two assumptions: (1) users have access to multiple devices and (2) attackers will not resort to hacking the human, using social engineering techniques.

In this paper, we propose and explore the potential of using human-based computation instead of solely technical solutions to mitigate the threat of untrusted devices and channels. ZeTA (Zero Trust Authentication on untrusted channels) has the potential to allow people to authenticate despite compromised channels or communications and easily observed usage.

Our contributions are threefold: (1) We propose the ZeTA protocol with a formal definition and security analysis that utilises semantics and human-based computation to ameliorate the problem of untrusted devices and channels. (2) We outline a security analysis to assess the envisaged performance of the proposed authentication protocol. (3) We report on a usability study that explores the viability of relying on human computation in this context.

Freie Schlagworte: Security, Usability and Society;Secure Protocols;authentication;authentication secrets;human computation;innate human ability;reliable authentication;untrusted communications;untrusted devices;semantics;usability;usability study
ID-Nummer: TUD-CS-2016-0007
Fachbereich(e)/-gebiet(e): LOEWE > LOEWE-Zentren > CASED – Center for Advanced Security Research Darmstadt
20 Fachbereich Informatik > SECUSO - Security, Usability and Society
20 Fachbereich Informatik > Kryptographische Protokolle
Profilbereiche > Cybersicherheit (CYSEC)
LOEWE > LOEWE-Zentren
20 Fachbereich Informatik
Profilbereiche
LOEWE
Hinterlegungsdatum: 28 Jul 2016 18:35
Letzte Änderung: 30 Mai 2018 12:53
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