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On Probe-Response Attacks in Collaborative Intrusion Detection Systems

Vasilomanolakis, Emmanouil ; Stahn, Michael ; Cordero, Carlos Garcia ; Mühlhäuser, Max :
On Probe-Response Attacks in Collaborative Intrusion Detection Systems.
IEEE Conference on Communications and Network Security IEEE
[ Konferenzveröffentlichung] , (2016)

Kurzbeschreibung (Abstract)

Cyber-attacks are steadily increasing in both their size and sophistication. To cope with this, Intrusion Detection Systems (IDSs) are considered mandatory for the protection of critical infrastructure. Furthermore, research is currently focusing on collaborative architectures for IDSs, creating a Collaborative IDS (CIDS). In such a system a number of IDS monitors work together towards creating a holistic picture of the monitored network. Nevertheless, a class of attacks exists, called probe-response, which can assist adversaries to detect the network position of CIDS monitors. This can significantly affect the advantages of a CIDS. In this paper, we introduce PREPARE, a framework for deploying probe-response attacks and also for studying methods for their mitigation. Moreover, we present significant improvements on both the effectiveness of probe-response attacks as well as on mitigation techniques for detecting them. We evaluate our approach via an extensive simulation and a real-world attack deployment that targets two CIDSs. Our results show that our framework can be practically utilized, that our proposals significantly improve probe-response attacks and, lastly, that the introduced detection and mitigation techniques are effective.

Typ des Eintrags: Konferenzveröffentlichung ( nicht bekannt)
Erschienen: 2016
Autor(en): Vasilomanolakis, Emmanouil ; Stahn, Michael ; Cordero, Carlos Garcia ; Mühlhäuser, Max
Titel: On Probe-Response Attacks in Collaborative Intrusion Detection Systems
Sprache: Englisch
Kurzbeschreibung (Abstract):

Cyber-attacks are steadily increasing in both their size and sophistication. To cope with this, Intrusion Detection Systems (IDSs) are considered mandatory for the protection of critical infrastructure. Furthermore, research is currently focusing on collaborative architectures for IDSs, creating a Collaborative IDS (CIDS). In such a system a number of IDS monitors work together towards creating a holistic picture of the monitored network. Nevertheless, a class of attacks exists, called probe-response, which can assist adversaries to detect the network position of CIDS monitors. This can significantly affect the advantages of a CIDS. In this paper, we introduce PREPARE, a framework for deploying probe-response attacks and also for studying methods for their mitigation. Moreover, we present significant improvements on both the effectiveness of probe-response attacks as well as on mitigation techniques for detecting them. We evaluate our approach via an extensive simulation and a real-world attack deployment that targets two CIDSs. Our results show that our framework can be practically utilized, that our proposals significantly improve probe-response attacks and, lastly, that the introduced detection and mitigation techniques are effective.

Buchtitel: IEEE Conference on Communications and Network Security
Verlag: IEEE
Freie Schlagworte: - SSI - Area Secure Smart Infrastructures;SPIN: Smart Protection in Infrastructures and Networks
Fachbereich(e)/-gebiet(e): 20 Fachbereich Informatik > Telekooperation
DFG-Sonderforschungsbereiche (inkl. Transregio) > Sonderforschungsbereiche > SFB 1119: CROSSING – Kryptographiebasierte Sicherheitslösungen als Grundlage für Vertrauen in heutigen und zukünftigen IT-Systemen
LOEWE > LOEWE-Zentren > CRISP - Center for Research in Security and Privacy
20 Fachbereich Informatik
Profilbereiche > Cybersicherheit (CYSEC)
LOEWE > LOEWE-Zentren
DFG-Sonderforschungsbereiche (inkl. Transregio) > Sonderforschungsbereiche
Profilbereiche
LOEWE
DFG-Sonderforschungsbereiche (inkl. Transregio)
Veranstaltungsort: Philadelphia, USA
Hinterlegungsdatum: 31 Dez 2016 12:59
DOI: 10.1109/CNS.2016.7860495
ID-Nummer: TUD-CS-2016-0164
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