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On the Impact of Incentives in eMule: Analysis and Measurements of a Popular File-Sharing Application

Carra, Damiano ; Michiardi, Pietro ; Salah, Hani ; Strufe, Thorsten (2012)
On the Impact of Incentives in eMule: Analysis and Measurements of a Popular File-Sharing Application.
In: IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications - Special Issue on Emerging Technologies in Communications
Artikel, Bibliographie

Kurzbeschreibung (Abstract)

Motivated by the popularity of content distribution and file sharing applications that nowadays dominate Internet traffic, we focus on the incentive mechanism of a very popular, yet not very well studied, peer-to-peer application, eMule. In our work, we recognize that the incentive scheme of eMule is more sophisticated than current alternatives (e.g., BitTorrent) as it uses a general, priority-based, time-dependent queuing discipline to differentiate service among cooperative users and free-riders. In this paper, we describe a general model of such an incentive mechanism and analyze its properties in terms of application performance. We validate our model using both numerical simulations (when analytical techniques become prohibitive) and with a measurement campaign of the live eMule system. Our results, in addition to validating our model, indicate that the incentive scheme of eMule suffers from starvation. Therefore, we present an alternative scheme that mitigates this problem, and validate it through numerical simulations and a second measurement campaign.

Typ des Eintrags: Artikel
Erschienen: 2012
Autor(en): Carra, Damiano ; Michiardi, Pietro ; Salah, Hani ; Strufe, Thorsten
Art des Eintrags: Bibliographie
Titel: On the Impact of Incentives in eMule: Analysis and Measurements of a Popular File-Sharing Application
Sprache: Deutsch
Publikationsjahr: 2012
Titel der Zeitschrift, Zeitung oder Schriftenreihe: IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications - Special Issue on Emerging Technologies in Communications
Kurzbeschreibung (Abstract):

Motivated by the popularity of content distribution and file sharing applications that nowadays dominate Internet traffic, we focus on the incentive mechanism of a very popular, yet not very well studied, peer-to-peer application, eMule. In our work, we recognize that the incentive scheme of eMule is more sophisticated than current alternatives (e.g., BitTorrent) as it uses a general, priority-based, time-dependent queuing discipline to differentiate service among cooperative users and free-riders. In this paper, we describe a general model of such an incentive mechanism and analyze its properties in terms of application performance. We validate our model using both numerical simulations (when analytical techniques become prohibitive) and with a measurement campaign of the live eMule system. Our results, in addition to validating our model, indicate that the incentive scheme of eMule suffers from starvation. Therefore, we present an alternative scheme that mitigates this problem, and validate it through numerical simulations and a second measurement campaign.

Freie Schlagworte: Dynamic Priority, Performance Evaluation
ID-Nummer: TUD-CS-2012-0287
Fachbereich(e)/-gebiet(e): 20 Fachbereich Informatik > Peer-to-Peer Netzwerke
20 Fachbereich Informatik
Hinterlegungsdatum: 27 Jul 2016 16:32
Letzte Änderung: 17 Mai 2018 21:50
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