Madlener, Felix ; Stoettinger, Marc ; Huss, Sorin (2009)
Novel Hardening Techniques against Differential Power Analysis for Multiplication in GF(2^n).
doi: 10.1109/FPT.2009.5377676
Konferenzveröffentlichung, Bibliographie
Kurzbeschreibung (Abstract)
Side channel attacks have changed the design of secure cryptosystems dramatically. Today a reasonable designed cryptosystem has not only to be cryptographically secure, but resistant against side channel attacks as well. Therefore, a lot of countermeasure techniques have been developed in the last years to avoid exploitable information leaking. In this paper we introduce a new approach to secure the multiplication in GF(2^n), an essential operation of elliptic curve cryptography, against differential power analysis attacks. Our hiding technique improves the resistance of a multiplier, even if the attacker has strong knowledge about its architecture. It is scalable and allows to choose arbitrary trade-offs between performance and side channel resistance. The additional costs to secure the multiplier are very low compared to other countermeasures.
| Typ des Eintrags: | Konferenzveröffentlichung |
|---|---|
| Erschienen: | 2009 |
| Autor(en): | Madlener, Felix ; Stoettinger, Marc ; Huss, Sorin |
| Art des Eintrags: | Bibliographie |
| Titel: | Novel Hardening Techniques against Differential Power Analysis for Multiplication in GF(2^n) |
| Sprache: | Englisch |
| Publikationsjahr: | Dezember 2009 |
| Buchtitel: | IEEE International Conference on Field-Programmable Technology (ICFPT'09) |
| DOI: | 10.1109/FPT.2009.5377676 |
| Kurzbeschreibung (Abstract): | Side channel attacks have changed the design of secure cryptosystems dramatically. Today a reasonable designed cryptosystem has not only to be cryptographically secure, but resistant against side channel attacks as well. Therefore, a lot of countermeasure techniques have been developed in the last years to avoid exploitable information leaking. In this paper we introduce a new approach to secure the multiplication in GF(2^n), an essential operation of elliptic curve cryptography, against differential power analysis attacks. Our hiding technique improves the resistance of a multiplier, even if the attacker has strong knowledge about its architecture. It is scalable and allows to choose arbitrary trade-offs between performance and side channel resistance. The additional costs to secure the multiplier are very low compared to other countermeasures. |
| Freie Schlagworte: | Secure Things |
| Fachbereich(e)/-gebiet(e): | LOEWE > LOEWE-Zentren > CASED – Center for Advanced Security Research Darmstadt LOEWE > LOEWE-Zentren LOEWE |
| Hinterlegungsdatum: | 31 Dez 2016 00:15 |
| Letzte Änderung: | 17 Mai 2018 13:02 |
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