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Attacking code/lattice-based cryptosystems using Partial Knowledge

Niebuhr, Robert ; Cayrel, Pierre-Louis ; Bulygin, Stanislav ; Buchmann, Johannes (2010)
Attacking code/lattice-based cryptosystems using Partial Knowledge.
Konferenzveröffentlichung, Bibliographie

Kurzbeschreibung (Abstract)

Code-based cryptographic schemes are promising candidates for post-quantum cryptography since they are fast, require only basic arithmetic, and because their security is well understood. While most analyses of security assume that an attacker does not have any information about the secret key, we show that in certain scenarios an attacker can gain partial knowledge of the secret key. We present how this knowledge can be used to improve the efficiency of an attack, and give new bounds for the complexity of such an attack. In this paper, we analyze two types of partial knowledge including concrete scenarios, and give an idea how to prevent the leak of such knowledge to an attacker.

Typ des Eintrags: Konferenzveröffentlichung
Erschienen: 2010
Autor(en): Niebuhr, Robert ; Cayrel, Pierre-Louis ; Bulygin, Stanislav ; Buchmann, Johannes
Art des Eintrags: Bibliographie
Titel: Attacking code/lattice-based cryptosystems using Partial Knowledge
Sprache: Englisch
Publikationsjahr: 2010
Verlag: China Press
Buchtitel: Proceedings of Inscrypt 2010
Kurzbeschreibung (Abstract):

Code-based cryptographic schemes are promising candidates for post-quantum cryptography since they are fast, require only basic arithmetic, and because their security is well understood. While most analyses of security assume that an attacker does not have any information about the secret key, we show that in certain scenarios an attacker can gain partial knowledge of the secret key. We present how this knowledge can be used to improve the efficiency of an attack, and give new bounds for the complexity of such an attack. In this paper, we analyze two types of partial knowledge including concrete scenarios, and give an idea how to prevent the leak of such knowledge to an attacker.

Freie Schlagworte: Secure Data
ID-Nummer: TUD-CS-2010-0232
Fachbereich(e)/-gebiet(e): LOEWE > LOEWE-Zentren > CASED – Center for Advanced Security Research Darmstadt
20 Fachbereich Informatik > Theoretische Informatik - Kryptographie und Computeralgebra
LOEWE > LOEWE-Zentren
20 Fachbereich Informatik
LOEWE
Hinterlegungsdatum: 30 Dez 2016 20:23
Letzte Änderung: 17 Mai 2018 13:02
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