Bulygin, Stanislav ; Brickenstein, Michael (2010)
Obtaining and solving systems of equations in key variables only for the small variants of AES.
In: Mathematics in Computer science Special Issue "Symbolic Computation and Cryptography", 2 (3)
doi: 10.1007/s11786-009-0020-y
Artikel, Bibliographie
Kurzbeschreibung (Abstract)
This work is devoted to attacking the small scale variants of the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) via systems that contain only the initial key variables. To this end, we introduce a system of equations that naturally arises in the AES, and then eliminate all the intermediate variables via normal form reductions. The resulting system in key variables only is solved then. We also consider a possibility to apply our method in the meet-in-the-middle scenario especially with several plaintext/ciphertext pairs. We elaborate on the method further by looking for subsystems which contain fewer variables and are overdetermined, thus facilitating solving the large system.
| Typ des Eintrags: | Artikel |
|---|---|
| Erschienen: | 2010 |
| Autor(en): | Bulygin, Stanislav ; Brickenstein, Michael |
| Art des Eintrags: | Bibliographie |
| Titel: | Obtaining and solving systems of equations in key variables only for the small variants of AES |
| Sprache: | Englisch |
| Publikationsjahr: | März 2010 |
| Titel der Zeitschrift, Zeitung oder Schriftenreihe: | Mathematics in Computer science Special Issue "Symbolic Computation and Cryptography" |
| Jahrgang/Volume einer Zeitschrift: | 2 |
| (Heft-)Nummer: | 3 |
| DOI: | 10.1007/s11786-009-0020-y |
| Kurzbeschreibung (Abstract): | This work is devoted to attacking the small scale variants of the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) via systems that contain only the initial key variables. To this end, we introduce a system of equations that naturally arises in the AES, and then eliminate all the intermediate variables via normal form reductions. The resulting system in key variables only is solved then. We also consider a possibility to apply our method in the meet-in-the-middle scenario especially with several plaintext/ciphertext pairs. We elaborate on the method further by looking for subsystems which contain fewer variables and are overdetermined, thus facilitating solving the large system. |
| Freie Schlagworte: | Secure Data;Algebraic attack, Meet-in-the-middle attack, AES, Gröbner basis, Normal form |
| ID-Nummer: | TUD-CS-2008-1145 |
| Fachbereich(e)/-gebiet(e): | LOEWE > LOEWE-Zentren > CASED – Center for Advanced Security Research Darmstadt LOEWE > LOEWE-Zentren LOEWE |
| Hinterlegungsdatum: | 30 Dez 2016 20:23 |
| Letzte Änderung: | 17 Mai 2018 13:02 |
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