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Practical Algebraic Cryptanalysis for Dragon-based Cryptosystems

Mohamed, Wael Said Abd Elmageed and Bulygin, Stanislav and Ding, Jintai and Buchmann, Johannes and Werner, Fabian
Heng, S.-H. and Wright, R. N. and Goi, B.-M. (eds.) (2010):
Practical Algebraic Cryptanalysis for Dragon-based Cryptosystems.
In: Proceedings of The Ninth International Conference on Cryptology And Network Security (CANS 2010), Springer, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, In: Lecture Notes in Computer Science, ISBN 978-3-642-17618-0,
DOI: 10.1007/978-3-642-17619-7_11,
[Conference or Workshop Item]

Abstract

Recently, the Little Dragon Two and Poly-Dragon multivariate based public-key cryptosystems were proposed as efficient and secure schemes. In particular, the inventors of the two schemes claim that Little Dragon Two and Poly-Dragon resist algebraic cryptanalysis. In this paper, we show that MXL2, an algebraic attack method based on the XL algorithm and Ding's concept of Mutants, is able to break Little Dragon Two with keys of length up to 229 bits and Poly-Dragon with keys of length up to 299. This contradicts the security claim for the proposed schemes and demonstrates the strength of MXL2 and the Mutant concept. This strength is further supported by experiments that show that in attacks on both schemes the MXL2 algorithm outperforms the Magma's implementation of F4.

Item Type: Conference or Workshop Item
Erschienen: 2010
Editors: Heng, S.-H. and Wright, R. N. and Goi, B.-M.
Creators: Mohamed, Wael Said Abd Elmageed and Bulygin, Stanislav and Ding, Jintai and Buchmann, Johannes and Werner, Fabian
Title: Practical Algebraic Cryptanalysis for Dragon-based Cryptosystems
Language: ["languages_typename_1" not defined]
Abstract:

Recently, the Little Dragon Two and Poly-Dragon multivariate based public-key cryptosystems were proposed as efficient and secure schemes. In particular, the inventors of the two schemes claim that Little Dragon Two and Poly-Dragon resist algebraic cryptanalysis. In this paper, we show that MXL2, an algebraic attack method based on the XL algorithm and Ding's concept of Mutants, is able to break Little Dragon Two with keys of length up to 229 bits and Poly-Dragon with keys of length up to 299. This contradicts the security claim for the proposed schemes and demonstrates the strength of MXL2 and the Mutant concept. This strength is further supported by experiments that show that in attacks on both schemes the MXL2 algorithm outperforms the Magma's implementation of F4.

Title of Book: Proceedings of The Ninth International Conference on Cryptology And Network Security (CANS 2010)
Series Name: Lecture Notes in Computer Science
Number: 6467
Publisher: Springer
ISBN: 978-3-642-17618-0
Uncontrolled Keywords: Secure Data;Multivariate crypto, cryptanalysis, mutants
Divisions: LOEWE > LOEWE-Zentren > CASED – Center for Advanced Security Research Darmstadt
20 Department of Computer Science > Theoretical Computer Science - Cryptography and Computer Algebra
LOEWE > LOEWE-Zentren
20 Department of Computer Science
LOEWE
Event Location: Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia
Date Deposited: 30 Dec 2016 20:23
DOI: 10.1007/978-3-642-17619-7_11
Identification Number: TUD-CS-2010-0180
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