Mohamed, Wael Said Abd Elmageed ; Bulygin, Stanislav ; Ding, Jintai ; Buchmann, Johannes ; Werner, Fabian
Hrsg.: Heng, S.-H. ; Wright, R. N. ; Goi, B.-M. (2010)
Practical Algebraic Cryptanalysis for Dragon-based Cryptosystems.
Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia
doi: 10.1007/978-3-642-17619-7_11
Konferenzveröffentlichung, Bibliographie
Kurzbeschreibung (Abstract)
Recently, the Little Dragon Two and Poly-Dragon multivariate based public-key cryptosystems were proposed as efficient and secure schemes. In particular, the inventors of the two schemes claim that Little Dragon Two and Poly-Dragon resist algebraic cryptanalysis. In this paper, we show that MXL2, an algebraic attack method based on the XL algorithm and Ding's concept of Mutants, is able to break Little Dragon Two with keys of length up to 229 bits and Poly-Dragon with keys of length up to 299. This contradicts the security claim for the proposed schemes and demonstrates the strength of MXL2 and the Mutant concept. This strength is further supported by experiments that show that in attacks on both schemes the MXL2 algorithm outperforms the Magma's implementation of F4.
| Typ des Eintrags: | Konferenzveröffentlichung |
|---|---|
| Erschienen: | 2010 |
| Herausgeber: | Heng, S.-H. ; Wright, R. N. ; Goi, B.-M. |
| Autor(en): | Mohamed, Wael Said Abd Elmageed ; Bulygin, Stanislav ; Ding, Jintai ; Buchmann, Johannes ; Werner, Fabian |
| Art des Eintrags: | Bibliographie |
| Titel: | Practical Algebraic Cryptanalysis for Dragon-based Cryptosystems |
| Sprache: | Englisch |
| Publikationsjahr: | Dezember 2010 |
| Verlag: | Springer |
| (Heft-)Nummer: | 6467 |
| Buchtitel: | Proceedings of The Ninth International Conference on Cryptology And Network Security (CANS 2010) |
| Reihe: | Lecture Notes in Computer Science |
| Veranstaltungsort: | Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia |
| DOI: | 10.1007/978-3-642-17619-7_11 |
| Kurzbeschreibung (Abstract): | Recently, the Little Dragon Two and Poly-Dragon multivariate based public-key cryptosystems were proposed as efficient and secure schemes. In particular, the inventors of the two schemes claim that Little Dragon Two and Poly-Dragon resist algebraic cryptanalysis. In this paper, we show that MXL2, an algebraic attack method based on the XL algorithm and Ding's concept of Mutants, is able to break Little Dragon Two with keys of length up to 229 bits and Poly-Dragon with keys of length up to 299. This contradicts the security claim for the proposed schemes and demonstrates the strength of MXL2 and the Mutant concept. This strength is further supported by experiments that show that in attacks on both schemes the MXL2 algorithm outperforms the Magma's implementation of F4. |
| Freie Schlagworte: | Secure Data;Multivariate crypto, cryptanalysis, mutants |
| ID-Nummer: | TUD-CS-2010-0180 |
| Fachbereich(e)/-gebiet(e): | LOEWE > LOEWE-Zentren > CASED – Center for Advanced Security Research Darmstadt 20 Fachbereich Informatik > Theoretische Informatik - Kryptographie und Computeralgebra LOEWE > LOEWE-Zentren 20 Fachbereich Informatik LOEWE |
| Hinterlegungsdatum: | 30 Dez 2016 20:23 |
| Letzte Änderung: | 17 Mai 2018 13:02 |
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