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Improved Differential Fault Analysis of Trivium

Mohamed, Mohamed Saied Emam ; Bulygin, Stanislav ; Buchmann, Johannes (2011)
Improved Differential Fault Analysis of Trivium.
Darmstadt
Konferenzveröffentlichung, Bibliographie

Kurzbeschreibung (Abstract)

Combining different cryptanalytic methods to attack a cryptosystem became one of the hot topics in cryptanalysis. In particular, algebraic methods in side channel and differential fault analysis (DFA) attracted a lot of attention recently. In [13], Hojsik and Rudolf used DFA to recover the inner state of the stream cipher Trivium which leads to recovering the secret key. For this attack, they required 3.2 one-bit fault injections on average and 800 keystream bits. In this paper, we give an example of combining DFA attacks and algebraic attacks. We use algebraic methods to improve the DFA of Trivium [13]. Our improved DFA attack recovers the inner state of Trivium by using only 2 fault injections and only 420 keystream bits.

Typ des Eintrags: Konferenzveröffentlichung
Erschienen: 2011
Autor(en): Mohamed, Mohamed Saied Emam ; Bulygin, Stanislav ; Buchmann, Johannes
Art des Eintrags: Bibliographie
Titel: Improved Differential Fault Analysis of Trivium
Sprache: Englisch
Publikationsjahr: Februar 2011
Buchtitel: Proceedings of COSADE 2011
Veranstaltungsort: Darmstadt
Kurzbeschreibung (Abstract):

Combining different cryptanalytic methods to attack a cryptosystem became one of the hot topics in cryptanalysis. In particular, algebraic methods in side channel and differential fault analysis (DFA) attracted a lot of attention recently. In [13], Hojsik and Rudolf used DFA to recover the inner state of the stream cipher Trivium which leads to recovering the secret key. For this attack, they required 3.2 one-bit fault injections on average and 800 keystream bits. In this paper, we give an example of combining DFA attacks and algebraic attacks. We use algebraic methods to improve the DFA of Trivium [13]. Our improved DFA attack recovers the inner state of Trivium by using only 2 fault injections and only 420 keystream bits.

Freie Schlagworte: Secure Data
ID-Nummer: TUD-CS-2011-0087
Fachbereich(e)/-gebiet(e): LOEWE > LOEWE-Zentren > CASED – Center for Advanced Security Research Darmstadt
20 Fachbereich Informatik > Theoretische Informatik - Kryptographie und Computeralgebra
LOEWE > LOEWE-Zentren
20 Fachbereich Informatik
LOEWE
Hinterlegungsdatum: 30 Dez 2016 20:23
Letzte Änderung: 17 Mai 2018 13:02
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