Buchmann, Johannes ; Dahmen, Erik ; Ereth, Sarah ; Hülsing, Andreas ; Rückert, Markus
Hrsg.: Nitaj, Abderrahmane ; Pointcheval, David (2011)
On the security of the Winternitz one-time signature scheme.
Dakar, Senegal
doi: 10.1007/978-3-642-21969-6_23
Konferenzveröffentlichung, Bibliographie
Kurzbeschreibung (Abstract)
We show that the Winternitz one-time signature scheme is existentially unforgeable under adaptive chosen message attacks when instantiated with a family of pseudo random functions. Compared to previous results, which require a collision resistant hash function, our result provides significantly smaller signatures at the same security level. We also consider security in the strong sense and show that the Winternitz one-time signature scheme is strongly unforgeable assuming additional properties of the pseudo random function. In this context we formally define several key-based security notions for function families and investigate their relation to pseudorandomness. All our reductions are exact and in the standard model and can directly be used to estimate the output length of the hash function required to meet a certain security level.
| Typ des Eintrags: | Konferenzveröffentlichung |
|---|---|
| Erschienen: | 2011 |
| Herausgeber: | Nitaj, Abderrahmane ; Pointcheval, David |
| Autor(en): | Buchmann, Johannes ; Dahmen, Erik ; Ereth, Sarah ; Hülsing, Andreas ; Rückert, Markus |
| Art des Eintrags: | Bibliographie |
| Titel: | On the security of the Winternitz one-time signature scheme |
| Sprache: | Englisch |
| Publikationsjahr: | Juli 2011 |
| Verlag: | Springer Berlin / Heidelberg |
| (Heft-)Nummer: | 6737 |
| Buchtitel: | Progress in Cryptology - AFRICACRYPT 2011 |
| Reihe: | Lecture Notes in Computer Science (LNCS) |
| Veranstaltungsort: | Dakar, Senegal |
| DOI: | 10.1007/978-3-642-21969-6_23 |
| Kurzbeschreibung (Abstract): | We show that the Winternitz one-time signature scheme is existentially unforgeable under adaptive chosen message attacks when instantiated with a family of pseudo random functions. Compared to previous results, which require a collision resistant hash function, our result provides significantly smaller signatures at the same security level. We also consider security in the strong sense and show that the Winternitz one-time signature scheme is strongly unforgeable assuming additional properties of the pseudo random function. In this context we formally define several key-based security notions for function families and investigate their relation to pseudorandomness. All our reductions are exact and in the standard model and can directly be used to estimate the output length of the hash function required to meet a certain security level. |
| Freie Schlagworte: | Secure Data;Computer Science |
| ID-Nummer: | TUD-CS-2011-0117 |
| Fachbereich(e)/-gebiet(e): | 20 Fachbereich Informatik 20 Fachbereich Informatik > Theoretische Informatik - Kryptographie und Computeralgebra 20 Fachbereich Informatik > Theoretische Informatik - Kryptographie und Computeralgebra > Post-Quantum Kryptographie LOEWE LOEWE > LOEWE-Zentren LOEWE > LOEWE-Zentren > CASED – Center for Advanced Security Research Darmstadt |
| Hinterlegungsdatum: | 04 Aug 2016 15:08 |
| Letzte Änderung: | 03 Jun 2018 21:30 |
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