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On the security of the Winternitz one-time signature scheme

Buchmann, Johannes and Dahmen, Erik and Ereth, Sarah and Hülsing, Andreas and Rückert, Markus
Nitaj, Abderrahmane and Pointcheval, David (eds.) (2011):
On the security of the Winternitz one-time signature scheme.
In: Progress in Cryptology - AFRICACRYPT 2011, Springer Berlin / Heidelberg, Dakar, Senegal, In: Lecture Notes in Computer Science (LNCS), ISBN 978-3-642-21968-9,
DOI: 10.1007/978-3-642-21969-6_23, [Conference or Workshop Item]

Abstract

We show that the Winternitz one-time signature scheme is existentially unforgeable under adaptive chosen message attacks when instantiated with a family of pseudo random functions. Compared to previous results, which require a collision resistant hash function, our result provides significantly smaller signatures at the same security level. We also consider security in the strong sense and show that the Winternitz one-time signature scheme is strongly unforgeable assuming additional properties of the pseudo random function. In this context we formally define several key-based security notions for function families and investigate their relation to pseudorandomness. All our reductions are exact and in the standard model and can directly be used to estimate the output length of the hash function required to meet a certain security level.

Item Type: Conference or Workshop Item
Erschienen: 2011
Editors: Nitaj, Abderrahmane and Pointcheval, David
Creators: Buchmann, Johannes and Dahmen, Erik and Ereth, Sarah and Hülsing, Andreas and Rückert, Markus
Title: On the security of the Winternitz one-time signature scheme
Language: ["languages_typename_1" not defined]
Abstract:

We show that the Winternitz one-time signature scheme is existentially unforgeable under adaptive chosen message attacks when instantiated with a family of pseudo random functions. Compared to previous results, which require a collision resistant hash function, our result provides significantly smaller signatures at the same security level. We also consider security in the strong sense and show that the Winternitz one-time signature scheme is strongly unforgeable assuming additional properties of the pseudo random function. In this context we formally define several key-based security notions for function families and investigate their relation to pseudorandomness. All our reductions are exact and in the standard model and can directly be used to estimate the output length of the hash function required to meet a certain security level.

Title of Book: Progress in Cryptology - AFRICACRYPT 2011
Series Name: Lecture Notes in Computer Science (LNCS)
Number: 6737
Publisher: Springer Berlin / Heidelberg
ISBN: 978-3-642-21968-9
Uncontrolled Keywords: Secure Data;Computer Science
Divisions: 20 Department of Computer Science
20 Department of Computer Science > Theoretical Computer Science - Cryptography and Computer Algebra
20 Department of Computer Science > Theoretical Computer Science - Cryptography and Computer Algebra > Post-Quantum Cryptography
LOEWE
LOEWE > LOEWE-Zentren
LOEWE > LOEWE-Zentren > CASED – Center for Advanced Security Research Darmstadt
Event Location: Dakar, Senegal
Date Deposited: 04 Aug 2016 15:08
DOI: 10.1007/978-3-642-21969-6_23
Identification Number: TUD-CS-2011-0117
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