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Using SAT Solving to Improve Differential Fault Analysis of Trivium

Mohamed, Mohamed Saied Emam ; Bulygin, Stanislav ; Buchmann, Johannes
Hrsg.: Kim, Tai-Hoon ; Adeli, Hojjat ; Robles, Rosslin John ; Balitanas, Maricel (2011)
Using SAT Solving to Improve Differential Fault Analysis of Trivium.
Brno, Czech Republic
doi: 10.1007/978-3-642-23141-4_7
Konferenzveröffentlichung, Bibliographie

Kurzbeschreibung (Abstract)

Combining different cryptanalytic methods to attack a cryptosystem became one of the hot topics in cryptanalysis. In particular, algebraic methods in side channel and differential fault analysis (DFA) attracted a lot of attention recently. In 2008, Hojsik and Rudolf used DFA to recover the inner state of the stream cipher Trivium which leads to recovering the secret key. For this attack, they required 3.2 one-bit fault injections on average and 800 keystream bits. In this paper, we give an example of combining DFA attacks and algebraic attacks. We use algebraic methods to improve the DFA of Trivium by Hojsik and Rudolf. Our improved DFA attack recovers the inner state of Trivium by using only 2 fault injections and only 420 keystream bits.

Typ des Eintrags: Konferenzveröffentlichung
Erschienen: 2011
Herausgeber: Kim, Tai-Hoon ; Adeli, Hojjat ; Robles, Rosslin John ; Balitanas, Maricel
Autor(en): Mohamed, Mohamed Saied Emam ; Bulygin, Stanislav ; Buchmann, Johannes
Art des Eintrags: Bibliographie
Titel: Using SAT Solving to Improve Differential Fault Analysis of Trivium
Sprache: Englisch
Publikationsjahr: August 2011
Verlag: Springer
Buchtitel: Proceedings of "The 5th International Conference on Information Security and Assurance" ISA 2011
Reihe: Communications in Computer and Information Science
Band einer Reihe: 200
Veranstaltungsort: Brno, Czech Republic
DOI: 10.1007/978-3-642-23141-4_7
Kurzbeschreibung (Abstract):

Combining different cryptanalytic methods to attack a cryptosystem became one of the hot topics in cryptanalysis. In particular, algebraic methods in side channel and differential fault analysis (DFA) attracted a lot of attention recently. In 2008, Hojsik and Rudolf used DFA to recover the inner state of the stream cipher Trivium which leads to recovering the secret key. For this attack, they required 3.2 one-bit fault injections on average and 800 keystream bits. In this paper, we give an example of combining DFA attacks and algebraic attacks. We use algebraic methods to improve the DFA of Trivium by Hojsik and Rudolf. Our improved DFA attack recovers the inner state of Trivium by using only 2 fault injections and only 420 keystream bits.

Freie Schlagworte: Secure Data;Differential Fault Analysis, algebraic attack, SAT-Solvers,
ID-Nummer: TUD-CS-2011-0128
Fachbereich(e)/-gebiet(e): LOEWE > LOEWE-Zentren > CASED – Center for Advanced Security Research Darmstadt
20 Fachbereich Informatik > Theoretische Informatik - Kryptographie und Computeralgebra
20 Fachbereich Informatik > Theoretische Informatik - Kryptographie und Computeralgebra > Kryptoanalyse und Seitenkanalangriffe (CSCA)
LOEWE > LOEWE-Zentren
20 Fachbereich Informatik
LOEWE
Hinterlegungsdatum: 30 Dez 2016 20:23
Letzte Änderung: 17 Mai 2018 13:02
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