Bulygin, Stanislav ; Buchmann, Johannes
Hrsg.: Lin, Dongdai ; Tsudik, Gene ; Wang, Xiaoyun (2011)
Algebraic cryptanalysis of the round-reduced and side channel analysis of the full PRINTCipher-48.
Sanya, China
Konferenzveröffentlichung, Bibliographie
Kurzbeschreibung (Abstract)
In this paper we analyze the recently proposed lightweight block cipher PRINTCipher. Applying algebraic methods and SAT-solving we are able to break 8 rounds of PRINTCipher-48 and 9 rounds under some additional assumptions with only 2 known plaintexts faster than brute force. We show that it is possible to break the full 48-round cipher by assuming a moderate leakage of internal state bits or even just Hamming weights of some three-bit states. Such a simulation side-channel attack has practical complexity.
Typ des Eintrags: | Konferenzveröffentlichung |
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Erschienen: | 2011 |
Herausgeber: | Lin, Dongdai ; Tsudik, Gene ; Wang, Xiaoyun |
Autor(en): | Bulygin, Stanislav ; Buchmann, Johannes |
Art des Eintrags: | Bibliographie |
Titel: | Algebraic cryptanalysis of the round-reduced and side channel analysis of the full PRINTCipher-48 |
Sprache: | Englisch |
Publikationsjahr: | Dezember 2011 |
Verlag: | Springer |
Buchtitel: | Proceedings of The 10th International Conference on Cryptography and Network Security (CANS 2011) |
Reihe: | Lecture Notes in Computer Science |
Band einer Reihe: | 7092 |
Veranstaltungsort: | Sanya, China |
Kurzbeschreibung (Abstract): | In this paper we analyze the recently proposed lightweight block cipher PRINTCipher. Applying algebraic methods and SAT-solving we are able to break 8 rounds of PRINTCipher-48 and 9 rounds under some additional assumptions with only 2 known plaintexts faster than brute force. We show that it is possible to break the full 48-round cipher by assuming a moderate leakage of internal state bits or even just Hamming weights of some three-bit states. Such a simulation side-channel attack has practical complexity. |
Freie Schlagworte: | Secure Data;Algebraic cryptanalysis, SAT-solving, PRINTCipher, MiniSAT, CryptoMiniSAT |
ID-Nummer: | TUD-CS-2011-0228 |
Fachbereich(e)/-gebiet(e): | LOEWE > LOEWE-Zentren > CASED – Center for Advanced Security Research Darmstadt 20 Fachbereich Informatik > Theoretische Informatik - Kryptographie und Computeralgebra LOEWE > LOEWE-Zentren 20 Fachbereich Informatik LOEWE |
Hinterlegungsdatum: | 30 Dez 2016 20:23 |
Letzte Änderung: | 17 Mai 2018 13:02 |
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