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Algebraic cryptanalysis of the round-reduced and side channel analysis of the full PRINTCipher-48

Bulygin, Stanislav ; Buchmann, Johannes
Hrsg.: Lin, Dongdai ; Tsudik, Gene ; Wang, Xiaoyun (2011)
Algebraic cryptanalysis of the round-reduced and side channel analysis of the full PRINTCipher-48.
Sanya, China
Konferenzveröffentlichung, Bibliographie

Kurzbeschreibung (Abstract)

In this paper we analyze the recently proposed lightweight block cipher PRINTCipher. Applying algebraic methods and SAT-solving we are able to break 8 rounds of PRINTCipher-48 and 9 rounds under some additional assumptions with only 2 known plaintexts faster than brute force. We show that it is possible to break the full 48-round cipher by assuming a moderate leakage of internal state bits or even just Hamming weights of some three-bit states. Such a simulation side-channel attack has practical complexity.

Typ des Eintrags: Konferenzveröffentlichung
Erschienen: 2011
Herausgeber: Lin, Dongdai ; Tsudik, Gene ; Wang, Xiaoyun
Autor(en): Bulygin, Stanislav ; Buchmann, Johannes
Art des Eintrags: Bibliographie
Titel: Algebraic cryptanalysis of the round-reduced and side channel analysis of the full PRINTCipher-48
Sprache: Englisch
Publikationsjahr: Dezember 2011
Verlag: Springer
Buchtitel: Proceedings of The 10th International Conference on Cryptography and Network Security (CANS 2011)
Reihe: Lecture Notes in Computer Science
Band einer Reihe: 7092
Veranstaltungsort: Sanya, China
Kurzbeschreibung (Abstract):

In this paper we analyze the recently proposed lightweight block cipher PRINTCipher. Applying algebraic methods and SAT-solving we are able to break 8 rounds of PRINTCipher-48 and 9 rounds under some additional assumptions with only 2 known plaintexts faster than brute force. We show that it is possible to break the full 48-round cipher by assuming a moderate leakage of internal state bits or even just Hamming weights of some three-bit states. Such a simulation side-channel attack has practical complexity.

Freie Schlagworte: Secure Data;Algebraic cryptanalysis, SAT-solving, PRINTCipher, MiniSAT, CryptoMiniSAT
ID-Nummer: TUD-CS-2011-0228
Fachbereich(e)/-gebiet(e): LOEWE > LOEWE-Zentren > CASED – Center for Advanced Security Research Darmstadt
20 Fachbereich Informatik > Theoretische Informatik - Kryptographie und Computeralgebra
LOEWE > LOEWE-Zentren
20 Fachbereich Informatik
LOEWE
Hinterlegungsdatum: 30 Dez 2016 20:23
Letzte Änderung: 17 Mai 2018 13:02
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